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INDIAN LAW
RICHARD W. HUGHES*

"Indian law," unlike most of the topics in this Survey issue, arises
mainly from principles of federal constitutional law, treaties, and
federal statutes. ' The area is one of federal law. State court decisions
are not binding precedent,2 and only the pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court are unquestionably authoritative. This
article examines several New Mexico appellate court decisions in the
field, and one significant decision of the United States District Court
for New Mexico. The cases are analyzed exclusively in the context of
relevant Supreme Court (and occasionally federal court of appeals)
precedents.
Only a handful of significant Indian law decisions arising in New
Mexico were handed down during the Survey year. These included,
however, two highly controversial cases that are sure to provoke
much comment and, possibly, further litigation. Those decisions,
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chischilly3 and UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally,' both turned ultimately on questions of
tribal governmental power to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on
off-reservation trust lands. The federal district court and the New
Mexico Supreme Court, by markedly different routes, and often in
apparently unnecessarily sweeping terms, held that the tribes have
no such power. Those two cases will be explained at length, followed
by a discussion of the key issues pertinent to both of them.
Last year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an extremely
important decision in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State of New Mexico,I upholding the exclusive power of the tribe to regulate nonIndian hunting and fishing on its reservation. That decision was
vacated by the Supreme Court, and remanded for reconsideration in
light of United States v. Montana.6 Mescalero will be briefly reviewed, with some thoughts on the implications of the remand.
*Partner, Luebben, Hughes and Kelly.
I. See McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
2. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
3. 96 N.M. 113, 628 P.2d 683 (1981).
4. 514 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.M. 1981).
5. 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981).
6. 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
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Two recent New Mexico appellate court decisions7 addressed the
issue of the applicability of New Mexico gross receipts taxes to nonIndians doing business within Indian country. Those cases will be examined against the background of the line of cases dealing with state
taxation of non-Indians in Indian country generally. The article concludes with some views on current trends in Indian law, particularly
as exemplified by this group of cases.
I. TRIBAL JURISDICTION CASES
A. GeneralMotorsAcceptance Corp. v. Chischilly
The first decision under review arose out of an effort by the Navajo Tribe to protect those Navajo consumers who purchase goods
on retail installment contracts from the hardships imposed by unconsented self-held repossessions. The tribe enacted a statute requiring either the written consent of the debtor or a tribal court order
before any repossession could take place. 8 Repeated efforts to enforce the Navajo law failed, until the New Mexico Court of Appeals
decided Chischilly v. General Motors Acceptance Corp." in 1980,
upholding the applicability of the tribal statute to repossessions on
Navajo land. On writ of certiorari, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, without reaching the conflict of laws issue addressed by the court of appeals. The supreme court decision dealt
entirely with the extent of Navajo governmental power on offreservation trust land, and raised several novel and disturbing questions on that issue. Because of the unusual significance of this case,
an extensive explanation of its origins is in order.
1. Background
The Uniform Commercial Code" provides that a secured creditor
may, upon the borrower's default, repossess the collateral without
court order if such repossession can be effected without a breach of
the peace." This notion of so-called "self-help" repossession poses
obvious problems. Confrontations between creditors seeking to enforce their rights, and debtors who may be quite reliant on the prop7. Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 95 N.M. 708, 625 P.2d 1225 (Ct.
App. 1980, cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412 (1981), cert. granted by the United States
Supreme Court Nov. 30, 1981; Tiffany Const. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 93 N.M. 593, 603
P.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 629, 614 P.2d 546 (1979).
8. 7 N.T.C. §§607-609 (1977).
9. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 770 (Ct. App. July 10, 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 96 N.M. 113,
628 P.2d 683 (1981).
10. The U.C.C. is codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§55-1-101 to 9-507 (1978).
11.N.M. Stat. Ann. §55-9-503 (1978).
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erty to be repossessed, can be unpleasant. ' On occasion, debtors unaware that they may lawfully oppose repossession, or who have valid
defenses to the alleged default, may give up their goods simply out
of fear.' 3 Repossessions often occur without the debtor's knowledge,
causing the debtor severe anxiety, inconvenience, and expense.
Problems of repossession have been particularly severe on Indian
reservations.
Not long after World War II ended, Navajo Indians began to venture away from the secluded commercial fiefdoms of the trading
posts scattered throughout their sprawling Reservation in Arizona,
New Mexico, and Utah, and to patronize the merchants of off-reservation communities in increasing numbers. There, particularly when
they sought to obtain that bright emblem of their new sense of mobility, the pick-up truck, the Navajo encountered the retail installment contract. Predictably, the finer points of secured transactions,
indeed, of contracts themselves, were unclear to these proud, largely
unassimilated herdsmen, few of whom then spoke English. The
droves of shiny new trucks that began chugging onto the Reservation
were followed, in due course, by agents of the sellers, come to retake
their collateral as provided by law.
The situation was ripe for miscommunication and the potential of
violence. It became clear that unlimited self-help repossession might
not be a wise or fair policy as applied to the Navajo. In 1954, the
General Superintendent of the Navajo Agency promulgated Navajo
Agency Order No. 2, in which he specified the duty of a Bureau of
Indian Affairs law enforcement officer who accompanied a creditor
seeking to effect a repossession on the Reservation. Paragraph four
of the order stated:
2

If the Indian agrees, without force or pressure to stand by his
contract and surrender possession of the property when he is behind in the payments he contracted to make, this agency will not
object to the seller taking possession of the property. However,
if the Indian will not give his consent, we will not permit repossession to take place.'"
Paragraph six of the order provided that where the debtor refused to
consent to repossession, the creditor's remedy was in tribal court.
Thus, the principle that self-help repossession would be allowed only
12. See, e.g., People v. Halliday, 237 App. Div. 302, 261 N.Y.S. 342 (1932) (decided under
similar provision of Uniform Conditional Sales Act).
13. See, e.g., Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 N.E.2d 683, 50 Ohio Op. 2d
47(1970).
14. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Dept. of Interior, Navajo Agency Order No. 2, at 14 (1954).
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with the consent of the debtor was established in Navajo country.
In 1968, the Navajo Tribal Council incorporated that principle
into the Tribal Code by Resolution CF-26-68, which provided, in
part,
The personal property of Navajo Indians shall not be taken
from land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe under
the procedures of repossession except in strict compliance with
the following:
1. Written consent to remove the property from land subject
to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe shall be secured from the
purchaser at the time repossession is sought. The written consent
shall be retained by the creditor and exhibited to the Navajo
Tribe upon proper demand.
2. Where the Navajo refuses to sign said written consent to
permit removal of the property from land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe, the property shall be removed only by
order of a Tribal Court of the Navajo Tribe in an appropriate
legal proceeding.' 5
The resolution provided that enforcement would be by criminal
sanction for Indians and exclusion from the Reservation for nonIndians. 6 A year and a half later, the Council added a civil sanction
less severe than exclusion. The Council declared that repossession of
personal goods belonging to an Indian on Navajo land, not in compliance with Resolution CF-26-68, was a breach of the peace, entitling the victim of the wrongdoing to damages "in an amount not
less than the credit service charge plus ten percent (10076) of the principal amount of the debt or the time price differential plus ten percent (10%0) of the cash price. ' ' I7
From one perspective, at least, this simple gesture in the direction
of consumer protection by the Navajo Tribe effected little change
from the old rule adopted by the Uniform Commercial Code. The
Code placed on the debtor the burden of showing that a challenged
repossession was accompanied by coercion, or otherwise may have
15. 7 N.T.C. §607 (1977). Although "resolutions" are the primary vehicles by which most
tribal councils enact legislation, Navajo tribal resolutions have, for many years, been codified
in the Navajo Tribal Code, a published and annotated compilation of Navajo law.
16. The power of a tribe to exlude non-members from its reservation has long been recognized. See, e.g., Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835 (8th Cir. 1908); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp.
26, 29 (D. Ariz. 1969); Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14 (1934), reprinted in I Opinions of
the Solicitor Relating to Indian Affairs 445, 466-67 (1975).
17. Navajo Tribal Res. CJN-53-69 (codified at 7 N.T.C. §609 (1977)). The damages formula is identical to that set out in the Uniform Commercial Code for violation of any of the
provisions of Part 5 of Title 9, which governs creditors' remedies in the event of default. N.M.
Stat. Ann. §55-9-507() (1978).
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amounted to a breach of the peace. The Navajo rule placed on the
creditor the burden of showing that the repossession was peaceful.
At the same time it provided at least minimal opportunity for the
Navajo debtor, who often had little knowledge of the English language and virtually no understanding of contractual obligations, to
become informed of his rights before it was too late. Despite its salutary purposes and minor impact on self-help repossession, however,
the Navajo Tribal Code requirement was widely ignored by some
off-reservation auto merchants. Unconsented self-help repossession
of motor vehicles continued to be the norm.
A striking characteristic of Resolution CF-26-68 is that the provisions are directed almost entirely at businesses existing outside of
Navajo land. Few retail establishments on the Reservation sell goods
on installment contracts. When an apparent violation of the repossession statutes occurred, therefore, the only place where the Navajo
debtor could try to enforce the Navajo law was in the state courts. 8
Although the reported appellate opinions represent only a tiny fraction of the number of such suits filed (mainly by legal services
lawyers on the Reservation), they clearly reflect the unusual difficulties encountered in efforts by Navajos to enforce their rights under
the tribal law. '9
One of those cases, however, Jim v. CIT Financial Services
Corp., did ultimately result in an important first step toward establishing a remedy for Navajo debtors whose property was repossessed
in violation of Navajo law. The New Mexico Supreme Court held in
Jim that the Navajo Nation was the equivalent of a "territory"
18. The Navajo Court of Appeals has held that the tribal repossession statutes impliedly
vested jurisdiction over non-Indians in the Navajo courts for purposes of action arising under
those statutes. Thompson v. Wayne Lovelady's Frontier Ford, I Nay. R. 282 (1978); see note
61 infra. Even should a valid judgment be obtained in the Navajo courts, however, execution
would almost invariably require resort to state courts.
19. See, e.g., Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192, 571 P.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1977)
(choice-of-law provision in sale contract governs manner of repossession as well as substantive
rights of parties); Jim v. CIT Financial Servs. Corp., 86 N.M. 784, 527 P.2d 1222 (Ct. App.
1974), rev'd, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975) (plurality opinions) (New Mexico need not recognize Navajo tribal law; 7 N.T.C. §609 (then codified at 7 N.T.C. § 309) is a "penal" statute,
which New Mexico courts thus need not enforce); Begay v. First Nat'l Bank, 84 N.M. 83, 499
P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 77, 499 P.2d 999 (1972) (designation of
district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law for purposes of ruling on motion to
dismiss as "stipulated" findings and conclusions, and plaintiffs' attorney's endorsement
thereof, barred any challenge to district court's judgment); Kellywood v. First Nat'l Bank, 84
N.M. 83, 499 P.2d 1005 (Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 84 N.M. 77, 499 P.2d 999 (1972) (consolidated on appeal with Begay) (district court's finding that repossession occurred in parking
lot of PHS Hospital in Shiprock, New Mexico, not sufficient to establish that repossession occurred on the Navajo Reservation, an essential element of claim).
20. 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1738. This Act provides that the
properly authenticated legislative acts, records and judicial proceedings of every state, territory and possession of the United States
"shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from
which they are taken." 2" Navajo law was thus entitled to recognition
and appropriate force in New Mexico courts.
To say that a New Mexico court will apply Navajo law in an appropriate case did not, however, end the matter. The question next
presented was essentially one of conflicts of law-i.e., which law,
Navajo or New Mexico, should be applied to the particular situation. As the Jim court recognized, the first issue to be addressed in
the conflicts analysis was whether the parties had themselves made a
choice of law in the original sales contract that would govern the
manner of repossession. As that issue had not been addressed in the
trial court, and the contract was not in the record, Jim was remanded for further proceedings. 22
2. Chischilly in the Court of Appeals
The conflicts issue remained unresolved until the decision of the
New Mexico Court of Appeals in Chischilly v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,2 3 on July 10, 1980. The facts in Chischilly were generally typical of the earlier Navajo repossession cases. Chischilly had
purchased a pick-up truck in Albuquerque under a retail installment
contract, financed through General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(GMAC). He fell behind in his payments, and GMAC came to his
home and repossessed the truck, on two occasions, without obtaining his consent or an order of the Navajo tribal courts.2" Because
there had been no effective choice of law in the underlying con21. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). That section implements the constitutional requirement of full
faith and credit, see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1, and extends the requirement to the public acts of
territories and possessions.
22. 87 N.M. at 364, 533 P.2d at 753. Although Jim has not received unanimous approval,
, 571 P.2d 689, 692-94 (Ct. App. 1977),
see Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 117 Ariz. 192,
its holding that the public acts of Indian tribes are entitled to full faith and credit has been
555 P.2d 1334, 1342
-,
adopted elsewhere. In re Adoption of Buehl, 82 Wash. 2d 649,
(1976); see Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N.W.2d 430, 433 (N.D. 1977). In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the Supreme Court observed that "[j]udgments of tribal courts, as to
matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in some circumstances as entitled
to full faith and credit in other courts." 436 at 66 n. 21 (citations omitted).
23. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 770 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 96 N.M. 113, 628
P.2d 623 (1981).
24. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 771.
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tract, 25 the choice of law question was squarely presented. In a twoto-one decision, the court of appeals decided that Navajo law, not
the law of New Mexico, governed the legality of the repossession.
The opinion by Judge Lopez2" cited numerous authorities expressing a generally unanimous view that repossession ought to be governed by the law of the situs of the collateral.2 7 The holding that
Navajo law should govern in this case, therefore, may be seen as entirely consistent with the relevant authorities.
The majority easily disposed of GMAC's contention that the
Navajo repossession law is "penal" in nature, under a well recognized conflicts doctrine, a penal statute would be unenforceable in
foreign courts. 28 The court of appeals held that the principle applies
only to enactments that award penalties to the state, not those intended to provide reparation to aggrieved individuals.2 9 Again, the
decision on this point appears to be completely sound.
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The New Mexico Supreme Court never reached the merits of the
conflicts issue on its consideration of Chischilly. That court, instead
focused on the one respect in which the facts in Chischilly differed
from those in all the previously reported cases involving efforts to
enforce the Navajo repossession laws, 30 the fact that the repossessions occurred outside the recognized boundaries of the Navajo Reservation. Patrick Chischilly resided on tribal trust land, but in a
region characterized by a complex maze of land tenure patterns that
25. Id. at 773. The contract's choice-of-law provision governed only the interpretation of its
terms, not remedies for its breach.
26. Judge Lopez had ruled against the Navajo plaintiff in Jim, viewing the tribal law as
penal in nature, and thus unenforceable in foreign courts. 86 N.M. 784, 793, 527 P.2d 1222,
1225 (Ct. App. 1974) (Lopez, J., concurring), rev'd, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751 (1975). His
opinion in Chischilly (joined by Judge Hernandez, the dissenter in Jim), shows a significant
change in his view of the issues.
27. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 773-74. For example, the opinion cited Cavers, The Conditional
Seller's Remedies and the Choice ofLaw Process-Some Notes on Shanahan, 35 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 1126 (1960), a leading commentary on the subject, in which the author concludes, after
reviewing the authorities, that "[tjhe law of the situs at the time of repossession should clearly
supply the rules governing the seller's behavior in retaking the goods." Id. at 1141.
28. See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918); Huntington v.
Atrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). The rule is an extension of the well-established doctrine that courts
of one state will not enforce the criminal laws of another state.
29. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 774; cf. Jim v. CIT Financial Servs. Corp., 86 N.M. 784, 787,
527 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Ct. App. 1974) (Lopez, J., concurring), rev'd, 87 N.M. 362, 533 P.2d 751
(1975). See note 22 supra. As pointed out in note 17 supra, New Mexico law contains an identical damages provision. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 55-9-507(1) (1978).
30. See cases cited note 19 supra.
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has given rise to the modern nickname for the region, the "Checkerboard Area." 3 ' The trial court had found that Chischilly's homesite
31. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 771. Unlike many other Indian tribes that dwindled in numbers
and vitality when confined on reservations, the Navajo displayed remarkable vigor upon being
released from the Bosque Redondo to return to the lands reserved for them by the Navajo
Treaty of 1868, 15 Stat. 667. Partly because they began rapidly to increase in numbers, and to
expand their area of occupation, and undoubtedly in part because that area was viewed by the
whites as largely worthless and unproductive, the Navajo had their reservation repeatedly
enlarged. See L. Kelly, The Navajo Indians and Federal Indian Policy at 17-20 (1968). Those
additions were, however, mostly in Arizona and Utah, into which the Navajo had begun migrating in the late 1800s. There was a large population of Navajos who, upon their return from
Ft. Sumner, New Mexico, resettled in their old familiar haunts in northwestern New Mexico, to
the east and south of the treaty reservation. Their presence, on lands to which they had no formal right of occupancy (their aboriginal rights having been extinguished by the 1868 treaty),
became a source of growing concern to the Indian Service, especially after the discovery of
artesian water supplies in the region attracted non-Indian ranchers to it. L. Kelly, supra, at 23.
The first major effort to deal with the situation came in 1907, when President Theodore
Roosevelt added to the reservation all federal lands within an area covering nearly 3,000 square
miles, east and south of the reservation boundary in New Mexico. Exec. Order No. 709 (Nov.
9, 1907). The real purpose of the extension, as subsequently affirmed by Congress, Act of May
28, 1908, ch. 216, §25, 35 Stat. 444, 451, was to allow individual allotments to be issued under
section 5 of the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. §348 (1976 & Supp. II1 1979), to all Navajos
residing in the area covered by the order. The unallotted lands would then be restored to the
public domain. Non-Indian hostility to any plan that would give the Navajos more land in New
Mexico, however, quickly led to two subsequent orders restoring the unallotted lands to the
public domain, before the allotment process had really gotten underway. Exec. Order No. 1000
(Dec. 30, 1908); Exec. Order No. 1284 (Jan. 16, 1911); L. Kelly, supra, at 24-25. (The same
sentiments eventually resulted in the enactment, in 1918, of 25 U.S.C. §211 (1976), which prohibits the President from creating or adding to any Indian reservation in Arizona or New Mexico, without Congress's consent.)
The subsequent unhappy efforts of the United States to provide additional land to the offreservation Navajos in New Mexico is recounted in interesting detail in L. Kelly, supra, at
27-36, 117-31. Several thousand allotments were issued, some land was purchased by the tribe,
and scattered parcels of federal land were withdrawn for tribal use; but political pressures in
New Mexico successfully blocked any effort to make major additions to the reservation, or
otherwise to consolidate the scattered Navajo off-reservation holdings. During the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, the plight of the eastern Navajos became a primary focus of Indian
Commissioner John Collier, who undertook a major campaign to secure passage of legislation
to extend the reservation boundaries in New Mexico so as to include at least most of that
population. As described in D. Parman, The Navajos and the New Deal 132-59 (1976),
however, Collier's efforts over a period of several years foundered, primarily due to the opposition of New Mexico Senator Dennis Chavez, whose motives apparently had more to do
with political antipathy than the merits of the Navajos' need for additional land. Parman
describes the defeat of the Navajo boundary legislation as "the worst blow the Navajo administration suffered in the New Deal." Id. at 159. It left the region a real "checkerboard area," in
which Navajo allotments, tribally owned or leased land, and federal land withdrawn for Indian
use, is thoroughly interspersed with private holdings, state sections, and public domain administered by the Bureau of Land Management. Though the pattern has been periodically altered
by isolated withdrawals, exchanges or other disposition, and occasional massive readjustments, see, e.g., 25 Fed. Reg. 8546 (1960), that pattern remains today. Of the 2,870,000
acres within the off-reservation portion of the Eastern Navajo Agency (the Bureau of Indian
Affairs administrative district that embraces the Checkerboard), tribal trust land, tribal fee
land, allotments, and public domain withdrawn for Navajo use total more than 1,650,000
acres. Record at 135, Chischilly v. GMAC, 96 N.M. 113, 628 P.2d 683 (1981). Approximately
one-sixth of the Navajo population (or about 20,000 persons) resides there. P. Reno, Navajo
Resources and Economic Development 28 (1979).
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was under the jurisdiction of the Navajo Tribe, and the court of appeals had no problem with that conclusion.3 2 The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, found the off-reservation location of the
land to be determinative of the case. The court held that the Navajo
Tribe could not extend the authority of its civil laws beyond the
Reservation boundaries, at least when those laws purport to regulate
the conduct of non-Indians. The holding raises relatively novel questions in Indian law, whose significance, especially for the tens of
thousands of Navajos residing in the Checkerboard Area, cannot be
overstated.
Justice Payne, writing for a unanimous court, began his analysis
of the tribe's jurisdiction with quotations from three major Indian
law decisions by the United States Supreme Court, Worcester v.
Georgia,3 3 Williams v. Lee,"4 and Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones.3" Each of these decisions noted the unique significance of
geographic facts to the decision of Indian law jurisdictional issues.
Chief Justice Marshall described the Cherokees' territory as an area
"with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia
can have no force ... ."" In Williams, the fact that the cause of
action arose on the Reservation appeared to be the decisive factor
leading to the unusual rule of exclusive tribal court jurisdiction
enunciated by the Court.3 7 Mescalero held that when an Indian tribe
32. 96 N.M. at 114,628 P.2d at 684.
33. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
34. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
35. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
36. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. Georgia had enacted legislation that purported to abolish the Cherokee government and subject the Cherokee to Georgia law, and prohibited any non-Indian from residing in Cherokee land without a permit from the Governor.
Rev. Worcester, a missionary, ignored the legislation and proceeded to carry on his work in
Cherokee country. He was promptly convicted of violating the Georgia statute. The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and held the Georgia laws invalid. The resulting political furor
nearly brought the Court to its knees, in what one distinguished commentator called "the most
" 2 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United
serious crisis in the history of the Court ..
States History 189 (1924). Justice Marshall's ringing opinion continues to be cited as the foundation of modern doctrines of governmental jurisdiction in Indian country, but it was of little
use to Rev. Worcester or to the Cherokees. Georgia ignored the decision (as it had ignored the
briefing and argument of the case in the Supreme Court), and the Court was unable to enforce
its mandate. Worcester was eventually pardoned and released, but within five years the
Cherokees were forced out of Georgia, and onto the Trail of Tears to the Indian Territory. See
Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 500
(1969).
3. Williams was a suit by a trader on the Navajo Reservation against a Navajo customer,
over an open account for groceries and supplies purchased at the trading post. The trader sued
in state court, and the defendant challenged that court's jurisdiction over the suit. The
Supreme Court held that the Navajo tribal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over the action,
since the transaction arose on the reservation. Just as any analysis of governmental authority in
Indian country must begin with Worcester, Williams is the starting point for deciding any question of Indian country court jurisdiction.
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sets up business outside of its reservation, absent some "express
federal law to the contrary . . . [it is] subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the State." 3"
The Chischilly court drew the conclusion from these three
authorities that the Reservation line marks the end of tribal civil
jurisdiction and authority, unless tribal jurisdiction is necessary for
"overriding policy considerations or to avoid hampering the Indians' right of self-government."" The court drew additional support for that proposition from its view that to hold otherwise would
cause a complex checkerboard pattern of jurisdiction, requiring
"lawyers and judges to consult tract books to determine whether to
apply New Mexico or tribal law," ' 0 citing Justice Marshall's dissent
in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip.II
The court was unimpressed with Chischilly's contention that Navajo Tribal Resolution CMY-28-70, 2 which extended the civil jurisdiction of the Navajo courts to causes of action arising on trust
lands, allotments, and dependent Indian communities outside the
Reservation boundaries, constitute the necessary assertion of tribal
jurisdiction. In the court's view the fundamental issue was whether
the tribe could validly exercise off-reservation jurisdiction at all. 3
38. 411 U.S. at 148-49. At issue was the applicability of the New Mexico gross receipts tax
to the income the tribe received from the Sierra Blanca ski resort and of state compensating use
taxes to the ski lifts and other fixtures. The ski area was off the Mescalero Reservation, on Forest Service land which was leased by the tribe. The Court found the use tax inapplicable by virtue of 25 U.S.C. §465, but held that the tribe was liable for the gross receipts tax.
39. 96 N.M. at 114, 628 P.2d at 684. The court did not explain the meaning of this language.
Given the opinion's frequent references to the fact that the tribal law purports to regulate the
conduct of non-Indians, the court may have intended this qualification to mean, at a minimum, that tribal jurisdiction over tribal members beyond reservation borders would be justifiable.
40. Id.
41. 430 U.S. 584 (1977). That case held that the Rosebud Sioux Reservation had been diminished by three turn-of-the-century congressional enactments. The United States had, until the
case was decided, treated the affected area as part of the reservation. Id. at 616 n.2 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). The effect of the decision was to place approximately 2,000 tribal members,
and the allotted lands on which they lived, suddenly outside the reservation. Id. Dissenting,
Justice Marshall expressed concern that the result would "create an 'impractical pattern of
at 630 (quoting from Seymour v. Superintendent, 368
checkerboard jurisdiction.... 'Id.
U.S. 351, 358 (1962)).
42. 7N.T.C. §254 (1977).
43. 96 N.M. at 114, 628 P.2d at 684. There appears to be some confusion in the opinion over
whether the court is deciding a matter of the extent of Navajo civil governmental authority, or
one of the extent of the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts. The former question would seem to
have been the one presented, since no tribal court action was involved, but the opinion does
state its holding to be "that a tribe cannot sua sponte enlarge the jurisdiction of its tribal courts
... Id. at 115, 628 P.2d at 685; see also id.: "[W]e hold that the tribal
over non-Indians.
" Since in either event the question
court did not have jurisdiction over the instant case ..
boils down to whether the tribe may regulate non-Indian conduct on off-reservation trust
lands, the reasoning would be the same. But see notes 137-139 infra, and accompanying text.
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More troublesome to the court were Chischilly's arguments based on
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. III 1979), a provision of the federal criminal
code that defines "Indian Country" as:
(a) All land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) All dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the
limits of a state, and
(c) All Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not
been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same."
The court appeared to concede that application of this definition to
the facts in Chischilly might force the conclusion that Navajo civil
law could validly apply to Patrick Chischilly's homesite. The court
refused, however, "to extend the same confusing pattern of jurisdicOn this point, the court declined to give
tion into the civil area."
any weight to the United States Supreme Court's statement in a footnote in DeCoteau v. District County Court."6 The footnote reads:
"[wihile § 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally applies as well to
questions of civil jurisdiction,"4 7 language Justice Payne dismissed
as "dictum." 8 Justice Payne's opinion concluded with the sweeping
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. Il 1979). See discussion notes 97-113 infra, and accompanying
text.
45. 96 N.M. at 115, 628 P.2d at 685. To be sure, land held in trust for a tribe that is not formally designated as part of a "reservation" does not appear to fall within any of the categories
of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. 111 1979). But see Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes v. Oklahoma, 618
F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980) (tribal trust land not within an Indian reservation is Indian country
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)); cf. United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938)
(Reno Indian Colony, purchased by United States as a home for needy Indians, constitutes
"Indian country" within meaning of 25 U.S.C. §247 (now 18 U.S.C. § 3618)).
46. 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
47. Id. at 427 n.2 (citations omitted).
48. 96 N.M. at 115, 628 P.2d at 685. Whether that is a fair characterization of the footnote
may be questioned. DeCoteau was two consolidated cases, each of which raised the issue of
whether the 1867 Lake Traverse Reservation in South Dakota had been disestablished by the
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1035. In both cases, the acts on which jurisdiction
depended had occurred on non-Indian land within the boundaries of the 1867 reservation. One
of the cases was a habeas corpus proceeding arising out of state criminal convictions. The other
was a civil child custody matter. The passage from note 2, quoted in the text, provided the
Court's explanation for its consistent reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1151, throughout the opinion, as
the benchmark for deciding both cases. See text accompanying notes 105-108 infra. The
passage thus might be seen as very much a part of the holding.
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declaration that "the tribe's civil jurisdiction ends at the reservation
line, and beyond it Indians, even in trust lands, are subject to the
same non-discriminatory laws as are all citizens of the state."" 9 The
court thus held that Navajo repossession laws have no effect
throughout the extensive Navajo land holdings outside reservation
boundaries, at least to the extent they attempt to regulate non-Indian
conduct. The court's opinion seems to assume that to give effect to
the Navajo laws in the Checkerboard Area would result in a significant expansion of Navajo governmental power, beyond its present
limits. 5" The Navajo tribal government has, since its inception, however, included the entire Eastern Agency (almost all of which lies
outside the boundaries of the Reservation proper),' within the reach
of its laws, services, and organizational structure. Thirty of the 107
Navajo "chapters," or local governmental units, are located in that
region, and the people there elect seventeen of the eighty-seven
members of the Navajo tribal council in addition to voting in elections for the chairman and vice-chairman of the tribal council.5 2 The
tribe provides the same services throughout that region-including
police services and many work and social programs-as it does elsewhere on the Reservation. The District Court of the Navajo Nation
sits at Crownpoint, Ramah, and Alamo, all in the Eastern Agency,
hearing a broad spectrum of civil and criminal misdemeanor matters. 53 This pattern is paralleled by the authority of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which likewise reaches trust land throughout the Eastern Agency." ' In light of this extensive tribal governmental preserve
in the Eastern Navajo Agency, the Chischilly court's concern over
49. 96 N.M. at 115, 628 P.2d at 685 (emphasis added). Throughout the opinion, the court
appeared to be limiting itself, quite properly, to the question of off-reservation jurisdiction
over non-Indians. The quoted passage, however, suggests a far more sweeping holding, the effect of which could be the dismantling of the entire Navajo tribal governmental structure in the
Eastern Navajo Agency. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra. The facts of the case simply
do not pose so momentous an issue, and the court's unnecessarily broad language here ought
to be disregarded.
50. The court stated, for example, that "Itihe plaintiff would have us close our eyes to the
problems inherent in expanding the tribe's civil jurisdiction." 96 N.M. at 115, 628 P.2d at 685.
51. Included within the Eastern Agency are the three "satellite" reservations of Alamo
(Puertocito), Canoncito, and Ramah. See J.Correll & A. Dehiva, Anatomy of the Navajo Indian Reservation 58-61 (1972).
52. 11N.T.C. §17(Supp. 1979).
53. In Navajo Tribe v. Holyan, I Nav. Rep. 78, 82 (1972), the Navajo Court of Appeals
upheld the tribe's assertion of criminal jurisdiction over tribal members throughout the Eastern Agency.
54. If anything, the BIA presence in the Eastern Agency is greater than it is on the reservation, due to the extensive BIA involvement in the leasing and permitting of individual allotments, in heirship proceedings involving allotments, and in the administration of allotment income. See generally 25 U.S.C. §§324, 348, 372-374, 391, 392, 396, 406(1976); 25 C.F.R. §§ 15,
104, 121, 131, 161, 172 (1980).
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the consequences of giving effect to tribal laws in this region is
curious.
As a state court opinion on an issue of federal law, i.e., tribal jurisdiction in Indian country, Chischilly cannot be regarded as authoritative. 5 Were its views adopted by the federal courts however,
its impact could be considerable. The opinion raises troubling questions of the nature of tribal power in "Indian country," and tribal
ability to control the conduct of non-Indians who voluntarily enter
Indian country for the specific purpose of taking Indian property.5 6
It may be that the Eastern Navajo Agency is a unique region, given
the extent of Indian land and the size of the Indian population found
there.57 Similar situations do exist elsewhere, 58 however, and the
consequences of hamstringing tribal power in such areas, as easily as
the court did in Chischilly, could certainly be substantial for the affected Indian people.
B. UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally
Just over two weeks after the New Mexico Supreme Court decided
Chischilly, the United States District Court for New Mexico handed
down a decision on a preliminary injunction motion in the case of
UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally.19 In UNC Resources the federal
court dealt a severe blow to the concept of Navajo court jurisdiction
over non-Indians, particularly with respect to activity affecting trust
land beyond the Reservation borders.
The case began with the collapse of a tailings dam at a uranium
mill owned and operated by United Nuclear Corporation (a subsidiary of UNC Resources) near Churchrock, New Mexico, just south of
the Navajo Reservation line. The federal litigation came about as an
effort by United Nuclear Corporation (UNC) to prevent tort litigation over the spill from being prosecuted in the Navajo courts. Like
Chischilly, the case poses troublesome questions about the ability of
an Indian tribal government to protect its members and its land from
the actions of non-Indians, in an era of increasing interaction between Indians and non-Indians.
The tailings dam failure, which occurred July 16, 1979, released
huge volumes of solid and liquid uranium mill tailings into an arroyo
and thence into the Rio Puerco, a stream that runs westerly through
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See text accompanying notes 1& 2 supra.
See text accompanying notes 82-135 infra.
See note 31 supra.
See note 41 supra.
514F. Supp. 358 (D.N.M. 1981).
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Gallup, New Mexico, and into Arizona, where it eventually joins the
Little Colorado River. Like the UNC mill (which sits on private
land), the course of the Rio Puerco in New Mexico is entirely outside
of the Navajo Reservation, but the stream does pass through both
tribal trust land and individual allotments occupied by Navajos.6
Several Navajos residing in the area filed civil suits against UNC in
the courts of the Navajo Nation. These suits were filed under a recent resolution of the Navajo Tribal Council that granted Navajo
courts jurisdiction over all "civil actions in which the defendant is a
resident of Navajo Indian country, or has caused an action to occur
in Navajo Indian country." 6 ' The suits alleged that the tailings spill
had occurred as a result of negligence on the part of UNC, and that
as a result, Navajo livestock were damaged, or rendered worthless to
their owners, and water supplies for domestic and stock-watering
purposes were rendered unusable. The complaints further alleged
that the residents suffered substantial mental and emotional distress,
and that all the injuries occurred on trust land subject to the jurisdiction of the Navajo tribe.62 UNC was served with process by personal
service on its statutory agent in New Mexico, pursuant to an order of
the Navajo court.63
The company made no appearance in the Navajo court actions, to
60. Id. at 360.
61. Id. Prior to the enactment of that provision, Navajo court jurisdiction was limited to actions in which "the defendant is an Indian and is found within . . . [the court's] territorial
jurisdiction," 7 N.T.C. §253(2) (1977), and other actions "which may hereafter be placed
within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court by resolution of the Tribal Council." 7 N.T.C.
§253(5) (1977). Construing the latter provision, the Navajo Court of Appeals held that by
enacting a forcible entry and detainer (FED) statute, with full knowledge that there were a
great many non-Indian lessees of land within the jurisdiction of the Navajo courts, the Tribal
Council had impliedly given the Navajo courts jurisdiction over non-Indians for pyrposes of
actions arising under the FED statute. Navajo Tribe v. Orlando Helicopter Airways, Inc., 1
Nav. Rep. 40 (1972). Similarly, in a suit brought against an off-reservation car dealer under the
tribal repossession statute, see text accompanying notes 15-18 supra, the court of appeals held
that the Tribal Council had intended by that enactment, too, to confer jurisdiction in the Navajo courts over non-Indians, for purposes of enforcement actions, inasmuch as the Council
undoubtedly realized when it enacted that law that most, if not all, repossessions would be carried out by non-Indians. Thompson v. Wayne Lovelady's Frontier Ford, I Nav, Rep. 282
(1978). In a simple action for tort, however, the court of appeals could find no basis for inferring that the Tribal Council contemplated or intended that Navajo courts exercise jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Bedonie v. Donaldson, 1 Nav. Rep. 73 (1973). The amendment to §253
quoted in the text was presumably enacted to avoid this piecemeal approach to jurisdiction
over non-Indians.
62. See Complaint filed in UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.M. 1981)
(No. WR-CV-390-80 Nav. D. Ct., filed August 13, 1980).
63. Nav. R. Civ. P. 3 authorizes service by several different means and permits the trial
judge to authorize service by "such other means as he deems appropriate," subject to due process considerations. See Yazzie v. Wyaco, I Nav. Rep. 134 (1977).
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challenge jurisdiction or otherwise. Instead, it filed identical complaints in federal courts in Arizona and New Mexico, naming as defendants the twenty-two Navajos who were plaintiffs in the tribal
court actions, on their own behalfs and as representatives of a class
of persons "who claim, assert and threaten to pursue claims against
plaintiff UNC" arising out of the spill." ' The complaint alleged that
the defendants had sued UNC in the Navajo courts, and that the
Navajo courts had no jurisdiction over the company and could not
lawfully assert such jurisdiction. The complaint further sought injunctive relief preventing the Indians from prosecuting their actions
in the Navajo courts. Finally, UNC asked for declaratory judgments
to the effect that the courts of the Navajo Nation had no authority to
obtain personal or subject matter jurisdiction over civil causes of action against UNC, that any judgment, order or decree entered by
those courts against UNC in the pending suits would be null and
void, and that UNC was not liable to any of the defendants as a
result of the Churchrock tailings spill.6 5 With its complaint UNC
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction."
The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. After extensive briefing and argument the district court
issued an opinion on May 8, 1981. The opinion denied the motion to
dismiss as to the issues regarding tribal court jurisdiction,6" and
preliminarily enjoined the defendants from pursuing their suits in
the Navajo courts, primarily on the ground that those courts had no
lawful authority to hear the suits.6" The court's reasoning in reaching that conclusion, though occasionally unclear, gives the ruling
unusual impact, and is worth reviewing in detail.
The defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction had
been the subject of voluminous briefs by both sides. The court, however, barely touched on the jurisdictional question. The court said
that the issue of Navajo court jurisdiction over UNC presented a
"substantial federal question," sufficient to warrant jurisdiction
64. Complaint at 3, 14, UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358 (D.N.M. 1981).
34-37.
65. Id. at 7-10,
66. The defendants stipulated that they would not pursue the Navajo court actions while
UNC's motion was pending, avoiding any need for a temporary restraining order.
67. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss insofar as UNC requested declaratory judgment of nonliability. 514 F. Supp. at 364.
68. Id. at 360-63. The district court found that the "substantial" burden of defending the
trial court suits, and the possibility of default judgments being entered against UNC in those
actions, constituted sufficient possibility of irreparable injury to warrant a preliminary injunction. Id. at 363. It also observed that the defendants would not be harmed by the injunction,
since they could bring their actions against t3NC in state or federal court. Id.

424
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 Supp. III 1979).69 As to the substance
of UNC's claim, the court accepted UNC's argument that the case
before it was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Oliphant
v. Suquamish Tribe,7 0 saying:
The power to try and to assess civil penalties is the power to invade other liberties which the United States has an interest in
protecting for its citizens against "unwarranted intrusions." Indian tribes therefore cannot exercise such civil jurisdictionsover
non-Indians without explicit congressionalauthorization.7
The court found additional support for its opinion in Montana v.
United States, " which was decided just six weeks earlier by the
69. Id. at 360. The supplement in United States Code does not reflect the 1980 amendment
(Pub. L. 96-486, §2(a), 94 Stat. 2369) which eliminated the $10,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement. That section, the general "federal question" jurisdictional provision, requires that the matter in controversy "arise under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States." The question whether a particular claim "arises under" federal law has been
called "[tihe most difficult single problem in determining whether federal question jurisdiction
exists ..
" C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §3562, at
397 (1975). Although UNC contended that its complaint arose under the Constitution, three
different treaties, and a variety of federal statutes, see Plaintiff's Opening Memorandum on
Application for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 3-7, 514 F. Supp. 358, the defendants
argued forcefully that none of the asserted laws, treaties or constitutional provisions presented
a substantial federal question sufficient to invoke § 1331. See Defendant's Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 9-10. The one federal law that, on its face at least, would
clearly support an action under § 1331 is the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976),
especially clause (8), prohibiting any Indian tribe from depriving "any person of liberty or
property without due process of law." In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978),
however, the Supreme Court explicitly held that the Act was not intended to provide any
remedy in the federal courts for breach of its provisions, except in the limited circumstances of
allegedly wrongful imprisonment, for which review by writ of habeas corpus was provided. 25
U.S.C. § 1303 (1976). The Court scoured the Act's legislative history, concluding that it was
"highly unlikely that Congress would have intended a private cause of action for injunctive
and declaratory relief to be available in the federal courts to secure enforcement of § 1302."
436 U.S. at 69. The Supreme Court declined to create the remedy that Congress, in the Court's
view, had rejected. But see Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d
682 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1421 (1981). In light of Martinez, one can only
wonder where the district court found a basis for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
70. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). Oliphant was a habeas corpus proceeding under 25 U.S.C. § 1303,
challenging petitioner Oliphant's arrest and detention by the Suquamish Tribe. Oliphant had
allegedly assaulted a tribal police officer. His co-petitioner, Belgarde, had been arrested by
tribal police after a high-speed chase that ended when Belgarde collided with a tribal police
vehicle. 435 U.S. at 194. The Supreme Court noted that at least until very recently Congress,
the executive branch, and the lower federal courts had consistently acted on the assumption
that Indian tribes had no power to arrest or criminally punish non-Indians, and it concluded
that that power was an incident of their sovereignty that the tribes necessarily surrendered
upon submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United States.
71. 514 F. Supp. at 361 (emphasis added).
72. 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). The United States had sued the state on behalf of the Crow
Tribe, to quiet title in the bed of the Big Horn River within the Crow Reservation, and for a declaratory judgment that the United States and the tribe had exclusive power to regulate all nonIndian hunting and fishing within the reservation. The Supreme Court held that title to the
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United States Supreme Court. There, in denying the Crow Tribe of
Montana any power to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians
on non-Indian-owned fee land within the Crow Reservation, the
Court observed that Oliphantsupports "the general proposition that
the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the
activities of non-members of the tribe." 3 The district court in UNC
Resources quoted that language, as well as the passage that follows
it:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities
of non-members who enter consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements [cites omitted]. A tribe may also
retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct
of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.74
"It thus appears," the district court stated, "that when the issue is
Indian tribal power over non-Indians, any civil authority of the tribe
stops at the reservation boundary." 7 5
The court then speculated on arguments that might have been
made by the Navajo defendants in support of tribal court jurisdiction, on the basis of the quoted passage from Montana.7" Defendants might have argued, the court surmised, that UNC has engaged
in "consensual relationships" with the Navajo Tribe for economic
gain, and that the injuries caused by the spill occurred on Indian
land. As to the first point, the court noted that none of UNC's dealings with the tribe had any direct relationship to the Churchrock mill
operation (although some of the ore milled there does come from
reservation leases). 7 It further pointed out the absence of any other
case law holding "that a consensual relationship with an Indian or a
riverbed had passed to the state on its admission to the Union, and while it upheld the tribe's
power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on Indian land, it held that the tribe had no
such power on fee land owned by non-Indians within the reservation.
73. Id. at 1258.
74. Id.
75. 514 F. Supp. at 362.
76. Montana was decided after all the briefs had been filed in UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally.
77. 514 F. Supp. at 362.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

tribe will subject a non-Indian to civil liability in a tribal court." 7 8
Finally, the court recalled that the Navajos' cases against UNC
sounded in tort, saying,
A tort defendant is much more at the mercy of chance regarding
the nature and extent of liability to which he may be exposed. It
is doubtful whether UNC could ever be said to have consented to
Navajo Tribal Court jurisdictionas a tort defendant, regardless
of how extensively it might have done business with the tribe.79
The court dismissed the idea that Navajo court jurisdiction could
be justified by the need to protect tribal land. While the tribe may
have the power to regulate "some kinds of activities" for that purpose, "any such power does not include requiring UNC to answer as
a civil defendant in Tribal Court for its off-reservation activities;
that issue was settled by Oliphant."80 The court held that in enlarging Navajo court jurisdiction to include suits against non-Indians,
the Navajo Tribal Council "was asserting a power that the tribe does
not possess. "
It must be admitted that the intended reach of the holding is not
altogether clear. The facts of the case show that UNC's mill and tailings pond were on private land outside the reservation boundaries.
Although the opinion seems to regard Oliphant as authority for invalidating almost any assertion of tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndians the outcome of the case did not require so sweeping a holding. In a few passages at least, the court appeared to be limiting its
ruling to the question of jurisdiction over non-Indians for offreservation activities. Even so, the opinion is by no means inconsequential.
C. Chischilly and UNC Resources: A Look at the Precedents
The Chischilly court focused primarily on the geographical reach
of tribal power, while the UNC Resources decision leans most heavily on the issue of non-Indian jurisdiction. Both courts, however,
reached similar conclusions: Indian tribes have little or no power to
regulate non-Indian conduct beyond the reservation boundaries (and
78. Id. at 363. The court distinguished Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), in which the
Supreme Court had held that tribal court was the only forum available to an on-reservation
trader for his suit against an Indian customer over an open account, see note 32 supra, on an
"implied consent" theory: "[The trader] knew he was dealing with an Indian." 514 F. Supp. at
363. See text accompanying notes 132-134 infra.
79. 514 F. Supp. at 363 (emphasis added). See text accompanying note 135 infra.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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perhaps within them too). Such a view is decidedly controversial,
and demands careful examination in the light of the relevant Supreme Court decisions. There are three points to be considered: 1)
the concept of "Indian country"; 2) the extent of tribal authority
over non-Indians; and 3) the relationship between governmental
power and court jurisdiction.
1. Indian Tribal Authority and the Concept of "Indian Country"
Any question of the geographical extent of tribal power and of the
applicability of the other doctrines of Indian law must begin with an
awareness of the meaning of "Indian country." The phrase has been
a term of art in the field since the first Indian Non-Intercourse Act
was passed by Congress in 1790.82 It has been used consistently by
Congress and the courts to denote the region of Indian use and occupancy in which special federal laws apply, where state law is largely
inapplicable, and where Indian tribes govern their own affairs. In his
monumental and still authoritative treatise on Indian law, written in
1942, Assistant Solicitor of the Department of Interior, Felix Cohen,
stated:
Although the term "Indian country" has been used in many
senses, it may perhaps be most usefully defined as country
within which Indian laws and customs and federal laws relating
to Indians are generally applicable. 83

While that concept has remained reasonably clear, determining
the actual location of "Indian country" has not been so simple. In
1796, Congress attempted to define the region by metes and
bounds,84 but gave that up in 1834 in favor of a more general de82. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §3, I Stat. 137. Upon its expiration, that act was followed
by the Act of March 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329. The second act, and many subsequent enactments, utilized the terms "Indian country" and "Indian territory" interchangeably. Compare
be found in the Indian country") with id., §6
id., §3 (refers to "every person, who shall ...
(after references to Indian country, refers to persons brought out of Indian territory). After the
passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411, however, which authorized
the President to set aside lands west of the Mississippi for resettlement of the eastern Indians,
the term "Indian Territory" came to refer to the lands thus specifically designated (which are
now known as the state of Oklahoma).
83. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 5 (1942); see also Memo. Sol. I.D. July 9,
1940, reprinted in I Opinions of the Solicitor Relating to Indian Affairs 964 (1975), where the
Solicitor, after reviewing the cases, opined that "Indian country is country where not only Federal laws but also Indian laws and customs apply." The opinion observed that under the cases,
"Indian country" referred to any class of lands set aside in any manner for Indian occupancy.
84. Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 1, I Stat. 469. The boundary was redefined by the Act of
March 3, 1799, ch. 46, § 1, 1 Stat. 743, and again by the Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 1, 2
Stat. 139, to reflect changes wrought by subsequent treaty cessions.
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scription.85 That description was repealed by its failure to be included in the Revised Statutes of 1875,86 however, and for the following 73 years it was left to the courts to ascertain the location of
"Indian country." That period saw drastic reductions in Indian land
holdings, and marked changes in the nature of Indian land tenure,
from largely unextinguished aboriginal title to "reservations" (created by treaty, statute, agreement, executive order, and other devices), "allotments," and other federally dominated areas. The
court decisions of the period, however, reflect a willingness to adapt
to those changes to maintain the integrity of the "Indian country"
concept. For example, in Bates v. Clark,8 7 the Supreme Court relied
primarily on its interpretation of the 1834 statutory definition, and
viewed the existence of unextinguished original Indian title as the
single criterion by which "Indian country" could be identified. In
Donnelly v. United States,88 however, the Court refused to be restricted by the Bates formulation, and held that the term should also
embrace lands added to a reservation by executive order. In the same
year, in United States v. Sandoval, 9 land held in fee by the Pueblo
Indians of New Mexico, under grants from the King of Spain, was
held to be "Indian country," on the ground that "the United States
as a superior and civilized nation [has] the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders." ° United States v. Pelican,9 held
85. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1,4 Stat. 729. That provision stated:
That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi and not within
the States of Missouri and Louisiana or the Territory of Arkansas, and also that
part of the United States east of the Mississippi River, not within any State to
which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this Act, be
taken and deemed to be the Indian country.
It is interesting to note that by legislatively excluding from the definition lands east of the
Mississippi within any state, Congress acknowledged the success of the states' refusal to abide
by the Worcester decision, see note 36 supra, and the inevitability of the removal of the eastern
Indians to the Indian Territory. See House Comm. on Indian Affairs, Regulating the Indian
Department, H.R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1834). Some eastern bands refused to
leave their homelands, however, and to accommodate them the United States ultimately reestablished tracts of "Indian country" east of Mississippi. See United States v. John, 437 U.S.
634 (1978).
86. Rev. Stat. § 5596 (1875).
87. 95 U.S. 204(1877).
88. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
89. 231 U.S. 28 (1913). The decision effectively overruled United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S.
614 (1876), which had held that Pueblo Indians were not "Indians" within the meaning of federal law. The holding in Joseph had been predicated on facts showing that the Pueblo people,
presumably unlike more familiar Indians, were civilized, intelligent and virtuous. To justify its
holding in Sandoval, the Court felt obliged to quote from reports of Indian Service officials
purportedly showing that the pueblos were "intellectually and morally inferior." 231 U.S. at
41-44.
90. 231 U.S. at46.
91. 232 U.S. 442(1914).
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that lands allotted to individuals under the General Allotment Act,92
although no longer within the boundaries of an Indian reservation,
remained "Indian country" fully subject to federal power and protection so long as they were held in trust. In United States v. Ramsey, 93 the Court found no reason to reach a different result with respect to "restricted" allotments. In United States v. McGowan,9" the
Court concluded that the Reno Indian Colony, a tract consisting of
28.7 acres purchased by the United States to provide homes for
several hundred "non-reservation" Nevada Indians, was "Indian
country" within the meaning of federal law. Justice Black's opinion
regarded it as "immaterial whether Congress designates a settlement
as a 'reservation' or 'colony,' " but rather viewed the fact that particular lands have been " 'validly set apartfor the use of the Indians
as such, under the superintendenceof the government,' "" as determinative of whether such lands constitute "Indian country." Under
that line of cases, it is Indian use and occupancy under the protection
of the United States which distinguishes "Indian country," and
makes applicable the unique jurisdictional doctrines of Indian law.
In 1848, Congress legislatively redefined "Indian country" in the
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (Supp. III 1979).96 As the Supreme
Court noted in United States v. John, 7 § 1151 was specifically intended as a codification of the holdings of Pelican, Donnelly, and
McGowan. It is important to note, however, that while § 1151 provides the rule for determining what is "Indian country" at least for
purposes of the federal criminal code, 98 the cases from which the section is derived retain independent authority, defining the term for all
other relevant purposes in Indian law.
92. 25 U.S.C. §348(1976).
93. 271 U.S. 467 (1926).
94. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
95. Id. at 538-39 (quoting from United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914) (emphasis
by the Court)). See also United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978), where the Court
stated, as to lands held in trust by the United States for the Mississippi Choctaws, but which
were not formerly designated a reservation: "There is no apparent reason why these lands,
which had been purchased in previous years for the aid of those Indians, did not become a 'reservation,' at least for the purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction at [the time they were
declared to be held in trust]."
96. The section was drafted as part of a comprehensive revision of the federal criminal code.
Chapter 53 of Title 18 dealt with crimes in Indian country, and section 1151 defined that term
for purposes of that chapter.
97. 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1978).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971) (crime committed on
tribally owned fee land in the Ramah Navajo community occurred within a "dependent Indian
community" within meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151; that phrase not limited to pueblos); United
States v. Mound, 477 F. Supp. 156 (D.S.D. 1979) (crimes committed within an Indian housing
project on tribal trust land outside boundaries of diminished reservation occurred within a
"dependent Indian community").
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In recent years the Supreme Court has decided a series of cases
dealing with the question of whether Acts of Congress that provided
for the allotment of particular Indian reservations to individual Indians, together with the opening up of the unallotted lands to nonIndian entry, affected the reservation boundaries. Depending on the
weight given to various factors (and perhaps on the predilections of
various judges), some of the acts in question have been held not to
have diminished the affected reservations at all. 99 All land within
those boundaries, therefore, whether Indian-owned or not, remained "Indian country" as defined by § 1151. In two such cases,
however, the Acts in question were held to have disestablished the
affected reservations, or parts of them.100 To the extent the point is
discussed, however, those decisions are uniform in regarding the
trust land in the disestablished reservation as continuing to be "Indian country." ° Both opinions refer to 18 U.S.C. § 1151 in reaching that conclusion, and those references bear discussion.
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip'0° was a suit by the tribe, seeking a
declaratory judgment that its reservation had not been diminished by
three congressional enactments passed just after the turn of the century. The Court ruled against the tribe, but it observed that tribal
members living on allotments in the disestablished areas "are on 'Indian country,' within the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1151, and hence
subject to federal provisions and protections."I03 It seems unlikely
that the phrase "federal provisions and protections" refers only to
the few sections of Title 18 dealing with crimes in Indian country;
rather, the reference appears to be to the broad spectrum of federal
governmental activity that pertains to Indian lands and whose geographical reach has always been seen as congruent with that of the

tribe. 104

DeCoteau v. District County Court'°5 involved state court civil
and criminal matters that arose on non-Indian land within the boundaries of the original Lake Traverse Reservation. The issue of state
99. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
100. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County
Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
101. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. at 615 n.48 (1977); DeCoteau v. District
County Court, 420 U.S. at 427 n.2 (1975); cf.United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914) (allotments in disestablished portion of Colville Reservation are "Indian country").
102. 430 U.S. 584 (1977); see note 41 supra.
103. Id. at 615 n.48 (emphasis added).
104. See note 83 supra, and accompanying text.
105. 420 U.S. 425 (1975); see note 48 supra. In the Supreme Court, the child custody matter
(DeCoteau) was heard and decided together with a criminal habeas corpus petition, Erickson v.
United States ex rel. Feather.
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court jurisdiction was the sole question presented to the Supreme
Court. In a footnote, Justice Stewart explained the issue as follows:
If the lands in question are within a continuing "reservation,"
jurisdiction is in the tribe and the Federal Government "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, [such jurisdiction] including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 18
U.S.C. §1151(a). On the other hand, if the lands are not within a
continuing reservation, jurisdiction is in the State, except for
those land parcels which are "Indian allotments, the Indian
titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-ofway running through the same." 18 U.S.C. §1151(c). Even
within "Indian country," a State may have jurisdiction over
some persons or types of conduct, but this jurisdiction is quite
limited. .

.

.While § 1151 is concerned, on its face, only with

criminal jurisdiction, the Court has recognized that it generally
applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction. McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, [411 U.S. 164], at 177-178, n. 17;
Kennerly v. DistrictCourt of Montana, 400 U.S. 423, 424 n. 1;
Williams v. Lee, [358 U.S. 217], at 220-222, nn. 5, 6, and 10.106
The Court clearly viewed the "Indian country" definition in § 1151
as the key to both cases, civil and criminal.
Early in the opinion, Justice Stewart set out what all parties, with
the evident blessing of the Court, viewed as "common ground . . .
that Indian conduct occurring on the trust allotments is beyond the
State's jurisdiction, being instead the proper concern of tribal or
federal authorities." 1 07 It is worth recalling that the state's claim,
and the court's holding in DeCoteau, was that the entire Lake Traverse Reservation had been abolished. The above passage made clear
that even the total loss of its reservation does not end a tribe's
power. As the Court observed, "[in such a situation, exclusive tribal
andfederaljurisdiction is limited to the retainedallotments. ",01
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held in CheyenneArapahoe Tribes v. Oklahoma,,09 that the civil jurisdictional rules
applicable to Indian country do not depend on any formal "reserva106. 420 U.S. at 427 n.2. The New Mexico Supreme Court correctly observed in the Chischilly decision, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 518-19, that the cited portions of McClanahan, Kennerly and Williams do not in fact say anything about 18 U.S.C. § 1151 being applied to "questions of civil jurisdiction." Those passages do, however, discuss 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976 &
Supp. I1 1978) and 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1976) by which Congress authorized certain states to
assume jurisdiction over "civil causes of action . . . which arise in the areas of Indian country" listed in the statute (emphasis added).
107. 420U.S.at 428.
108. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
109. 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980).
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tion" designation. The tribes sued to enjoin state regulation of Indian hunting and fishing on trust allotments and on lands purchased
for the tribes and held in trust by the United States. The tribes did
not contest the district court's ruling that their reservation had been
completely disestablished in 1891." 1 The Tenth Circuit, nevertheless, saw no reason to treat land merely held in trust for a tribe by the
United States as different in any material respect from such land that
has been formally denominated a "reservation." The court regarded
the definition of Indian country in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as precluding
state jurisdiction to regulate Indian hunting and fishing on such
lands.
One must conclude from these authorities, that "Indian country"
is the key concept in determining the geographical reach of the
special jurisdictional rules of Indian law, especially in light of United
States v. McGowan"'I and DeCoteau v. DistrictCounty Court. ,,2 Indian reservations are only one class of lands making up Indian country, albeit the best-known. The rules of jurisdiction applicable to Indian country apply equally to all categories: there is no basis for a
holding that tribal jurisdiction on an off-reservation allotment is any
less than that on reservation trust lands.' ' 3 Moreover, while the definition of "Indian country" in 18 U.S.C. §1151 may, by its terms,
apply only to the federal criminal code, that statute was intended to
codify case law that has long been thought to be of general applicability in deciding questions of Indian country jurisdiction. Even
apart from DeCoteau'sexplicit application of § 1151 to a question of
civil jurisdiction, the line of cases leading up to McGowan, and as
exemplified by the recent Cheyenne-Arapahoe decision from the
Tenth Circuit, provides clear authority for determining what is "Indian country" for all jurisdictional purposes.
110. Id. at 667.
I1. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
112. 420U.S. 425 (1975).
113. The New Mexico Supreme Court's reliance in Chischilly on Worchester, Williams, and
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, see notes 36-38 supra, and accompanying text, were thus
misplaced. Neither Worcester nor Williams involved any issue of off-reservation tribal authority, and Worcester was decided long before the complex land patterns presented in Chischilly
could ever have existed. The Court's reference to the "reservation" in Williams ought properly
to be regarded as shorthand for "Indian country." Mescalero did present a question of state
taxation of off-reservation tribal property, but the claim of immunity was based on tribal ownership of the goods. There was no contention that the leased Forest Service lands were "Indian
country." Admittedly, in Montana v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981), the Court for the
first time imposed some limitations on tribal power over non-Indians on fee landswithin reservations, that may be different from the limits on such power on trust lands. See notes 151-54
infra, and accompanying text. Where trust lands are concerned, however, the cases reveal no
basis for distinguishing between on- and off-reservation lands in determining the extent and
nature of tribal power.
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The import of this discussion as it pertains to Chischilly and UNC
Resources is clear. Whatever power an Indian tribe may have to regulate the conduct of non-Indians (a question to be addressed in the
next section), that power is the same throughout "Indian country"
-that is, all of those lands set aside under federal authority for the
use and occupancy of the tribe, including the allotments, tribal trust
lands, and withdrawn public domain. The courts' insistence in Chischilly and UNC Resources, that "the tribe's civil jurisdiction ends at
the reservation line,"'' is simply contrary to the pertinent statutory
and case law.
2. Tribal Power Over Non-Indians
To say, as the cases discussed in the preceding section hold, that
an Indian tribe may exercise the same governmental power on offreservation trust lands as it does on its reservation does not compel
the conclusion that either Chischilly or UNC Resources was wrongly
decided. Each case also presented the entirely separate issue of
whether a tribe may regulate the conduct of non-Indians within its
governmental jurisdiction, or subject them to the jurisdiction of its
courts for acts that occur there.
In UNC Resources the court viewed the power of the Navajo Tribe
to subject UNC to Navajo court jurisdiction, even for acts that allegedly caused damage to Indian land and property, as being of central importance. The Chischilly court appeared to attach major
significance to the fact that the Navajo repossession laws purported
to govern the conduct of non-Indian repossessors when they enter
Navajo land.
The existence, extent and nature of tribal governmental power and
court jurisdiction over non-Indians within Indian country are subjects that only recently have received the attention of the Supreme
Court, but they have been addressed. The Court has generally upheld a broad range of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian
lands, with the single major exception of the power to arrest and
punish non-Indians for violations of tribal law. An analysis of these
cases indicates that neither Chischilly or UNC Resources can be
justified on the argument that the tribe had no power over nonIndians in the circumstances of those cases.
There are three recent Supreme Court cases dealing with tribal
governmental power over non-Indians. Washington v. Confederated
114. GMAC v. Chischilly, 96 N.M. 113, 115, 628 P.2d 683, 685 (1981); cf. UNC Resources,
Inc., v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358, 362 (D.N.M. 1981) ("[W]hen the issue is Indian tribal
power over non-Indians, any civil authority of the tribe stops at the reservation boundary.")
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Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation",5 upheld tribal power to
tax the activities and property of non-Indians on Indian lands as "a
fundamental attribute of sovereignty." In Montana v. United
States"6 in the course of an opinion dealing with tribal power to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing within the reservation, the
Court acknowledged that tribes have general regulatory powers over
non-Indians that closely resemble the police powers exercised by the
state. Montana did impose restrictions on the ways in which tribes
could govern the conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands
within a reservation, but even there, the Court conceded that such
conduct could be regulated when it "threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe." ',7 The third recent decision dealing with Indian governmental power over non-Indians, Oliphant v. Suquamish
Tribe, 118is the only Supreme Court decision that has denied a tribe's
governmental authority over non-Indians on Indian land. The Supreme Court in Oliphant was careful, however, to specify that its
holding was "concerned only with the criminal jurisdiction of tribal
courts.'"' 9
That tribal courts are competent and appropriate forums for the
adjudication of civil matters involving non-Indians that arise on Indian land was decided more than twenty years ago, in Williams v.
Lee. 120 That case, one of the most frequently cited opinions in the
field of Indian law, held that a suit against an Indian by a nonIndian trader, for a debt incurred at a reservation trading post,
115. 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980). The case involved tribal taxation of cigarette sales to nonIndians at reservation "smokeshops." Tribal taxes and license fees on non-Indians had previously been sustained in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); and
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
116. 101 S. Ct. 1245, 1258 (1981). See text accompanying note 96 supra. Cf. United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (Indian tribes possess sufficient independent authority over their
lands and social relations to justify congressional delegation of power to regulate introduction
by non-Indians of liquor into Indian country).
117. 101 S. Ct. at 1258. It must be admitted that in light of that statement, the Court's outright denial to the tribe of any power to regulate non-Indian hunting or fishing on fee lands is
puzzling, and must be attributed to the particular factual record in that case. See notes 151-54
infra, and accompanying text.
118. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See note 70supra.
119. 435 U.S. at 196 n.7. Elsewhere in the opinion the Court repeatedly limited the decision
to the question of tribal power to "try" or to "impose criminal penalties on" non-Indians. Id.
at 204, 208, 210, 212. In Montana v. United States, the Court reiterated that "Oliphant only
determined inherent tribal authority in criminal matters." 101 S. Ct. at 1258.
120. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See note 32supra.
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could be brought only in tribal court.' 2 ' The Williams rule was reaffirmed in Kennerly v. DistrictCourt. 122
The Chischilly court did not specifically hold that the Navajo
Tribe was precluded from regulating the conduct of non-Indian repossessors on Navajo land. As explained above,' 21 Chischilly addressed itself primarily to asserted geographical limitations on tribal
power. In light of Colville and Montana, nevertheless, it seems apparent that a tribal law regulating actions affecting Indian property
situated within Indian country is well within the scope of those
powers that a tribe may exercise over non-Indians. There is, thus, no
support for the argument that the Navajo Tribe exceeded its powers
over non-Indians within its jurisdiction by the enactment of the
tribal repossession law. 124
121. The Court stated:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would
undermine the authority of tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence
would infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves. It is immaterial
that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction
with an Indian took place there. Cf. Donnelly v. United States [228 U.S. 243
(1913)]; Williams v. United States [327 U.S. 711 (1946)].
358 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added). The two cases cited by Justice Black, Donnelly v. United
States, and Williams v. United States, were both criminal prosecutions of white men for crimes
against Indians on Indian reservations. Their citation in the above passage suggests that the
Court had fashioned a rule of exclusive tribal court civil jurisdiction comparable to the rules of
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, which provide for exclusive federal (or tribal) jurisdiction of all crimes except those by one non-Indian against another.
122. 400 U.S. 423 (1971). The per curiam opinion held that Montana's failure to comply
with a federal statute that would have permitted it to assume jurisdiction over "criminal offenses or civil causes of action" in Indian country, precluded its courts from entertaining
"causes of action by or against Indians arising in Indian country." Id. at 427.
The New Mexico Supreme Court recognized the Williams rule itself in Chino v. Chino, 90
N.M. 204, 561 P.2d 476 (1977), an action for forcible entry and detainer involving the right to
possession of a house on fee land within the Mescalero Apache Reservation. In holding that
state courts had no jurisdiction over the action, the court said:
An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer deals directly with the question of occupancy and ownership of the land. When the land lies within a reservation, enforcement of the owner's rights to such property by the state court
would infringe upon the governmentalpowers of the tribe, whether those owners
are Indians or non-Indians.
Id. at 207, 561 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added).
123. See notes 30-49 supra, and accompanying text.
124. In Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 519 F. Supp. 418 (D. Ariz. 1981), the
federal district court for Arizona rejected the efforts of two off-reservation non-Indian automobile dealerships to enjoin tribal enforcement of the Navajo repossession laws against nonIndians on the Navajo Reservation. The opinion upheld not only the tribe's power to regulate
non-Indian conduct in that area, but also the authority of the Navajo courts to enforce the laws
through appropriate private civil causes of action.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

In UNC Resources, the court squarely addressed the issue of tribal
power over non-Indians, especially the power to subject non-Indians
to the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts. The court flatly rejected the
existence of such power. The court saw the case as being "closely
analogous to" Oliphant, and concluded that "[tjhe Oliphant case
controls here.'"I 5 The court observed that in Oliphant, the Supreme
Court had reasoned that the power "to try and criminally punish is
an important manifestation of the power to restrict personal liberty,"' 2 6 and that by submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the
United States the Indian tribes had necessarily given up any authority they had to exercise this power over non-Indians. The UNC Resources court saw "[t]he power to try and to assess civil penalties"' 2
as indistinguishable from the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, and it
dismissed the Navajos' arguments that Oliphanthad no applicability
to civil litigation. 28
The problem with this reasoning is that the court ignored completely the fundamental rationale underlying Oliphant's conclusion
that Indian tribes had surrendered the power to criminally punish
non-Indians under tribal law. In Oliphant, the Supreme Court could
find no decisive expression of congressional intent on either side of
that point. It concluded, however, after a lengthy review of court decisions and congressional enactments spanning the last century, that
there was "the commonly shared presumption of Congress, the
Executive Branch, and lower federal courts that tribal courts do not
have the power to try non-Indians."' 2 9 That apparent "presumption" that tribes had no criminal power over non-Indians, was the
Court's sole basis for determining that such power did not exist.
Other decisions of the Supreme Court, however, such as Williams
v. Lee, Kennerly, and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, explicitly repudiate any argument for such a "presumption" against the power
of tribal courts to entertain civil causes of action to which nonIndians are party. Williams and Kennerly mandated exclusive tribal
court jurisdiction for civil suits arising in Indian country between In125. UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. at 360-61 (D.N.M. 1981).
126. 435 U.S. at 210.
127. 514 F. Supp. at 361 (D.N.M. 1981). The term "civil penalties" seems misplaced in this
context. The suits filed against UNC in the Navajo courts sought only normal tort damages.
128. The Court viewed as irrelevant the asserted sophistication of the Navajo court system
and the protections afforded tribal court litigants by the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302 (1976). Nor did the Court regard as important the interest of the Navajo tribe in being
able to hold tortfeasors responsible for injuries to Indian land. Each of these considerations, in
the Court's view, was equally present in Oliphant. 514 F. Supp. at 361-62.
129. 435 U.S. at 206. See also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).

Winter 1982]

INDIAN LAW

dians and non-Indians. ' Santa Clara, which was decided two
months after Oliphant, noted that "[t]ribal courts have repeatedly
been recognized as appropriateforums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests
of both Indians and non-Indians."'3, In light of these cases, the
UNC Resources opinion's facile conclusion that Oliphant governs
civil as well as criminal jurisdiction is untenable. Indeed, Oliphant's
reasoning should support the opposite conclusion.
The opinion in UNC Resources made no reference to the "commonly shared presumption" that was essential to the decision in Oliphant, nor did it address Kennerly or the above passage from Santa
Clara. It did attempt to distinguish Williams, but only on the
grounds that the trader there had "implicitly consented" to tribal
court jurisdiction.' 32 Such a rationale, however, is nowhere suggested in Williams, or in Kennerly, whose facts were essentially identical to those in Williams. "' The UNC Resources court further suggested that the trader in Williams could, by limiting his credit sales,
control the size of any claims he might have to take to tribal court,
but that a tort defendant such as UNC is much more at the mercy of
chance regarding the nature and extent of the liability to which he
may be exposed. For that reason, the court regarded it as "doubtful
whether UNC could ever be said to have consented to Navajo Tribal
Court jurisdiction as a tort defendant, regardless of how extensively
it might have done business with the tribe."'"" Having thus demolished its own strawman, the court saw no need to deal further with
Williams.
As noted, no Supreme Court opinion has ever held that "implied
consent" was the basis for finding non-Indians subject to tribal
power in any form. The UNC Resources court's effort to avoid the
impact of Williams thus seems decidedly ill-founded. The above described passage is nonetheless significant, for it suggests an underlying, unarticulated rationale for the decision in UNC Resources
130. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
131. 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Chino v. Chino, 90 N.M. 204, 561
P.2d 476 (1977).
132. UNC Resources, Inc. v. Benally, 514 F. Supp. 361, 363 (D.N.M. 1981).
133. In Kennerly, the idea that there could have been any "implied consent" to tribal court
jurisdiction is highly implausible. The place where the debt was incurred was a grocery store in
Browning, Montana, a town incorporated under Montana law but located within the Blackfeet
Reservation boundaries. Browning is just a few miles from Glacier National Park, and thrives
largely on tourist business. The Blackfeet Tribal Council, moreover, had passed a resolution
attempting to give state courts concurrent jurisdiction over suits against Indians arising on the
reservation, an attempt the Supreme Court held to be ineffective.
134. 514F. Supp. 361,363 (D.N.M. 1981).
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that cannot go unnoted. The distinction drawn between contract and
tort cases, that in the latter the defendant has no control over the
"nature and extent of the liability to which he may be exposed,"' 3 5
strongly implies an assumption on the court's part that non-Indians
will invariably not be given fair hearings in Indian courts, and that
the only way they can protect themselves is to limit the amount of
money at stake in the litigation. If such a prejudice were in fact the
real basis for the outcome of the case, one might wish that the opinion had been more forthright. Nothing in the record of the case,
however, would support any inference of such a bias, at least in the
Navajo court system. The published decisions of the Navajo Court
of Appeals, moreover, reveal quite plainly that non-Indians, including non-Indian energy companies, can and do prevail in important civil litigation in the Navajo Court system. 3 '
The essential point here, is that the UNC Resources opinion failed
entirely to justify its conclusion, that the Navajo courts are powerless to hear civil suits against non-Indian defendants. The attempted
extension of Oliphant to civil causes of action is squarely precluded
by other more directly relevant Supreme Court authorities, as well as
by the language and logic of Oliphant itself.
3. Governmental Regulation and Court Jurisdiction
A third point worth mentioning, especially with regard to the
UNC Resources opinion, concerns the distinctions to be drawn between direct governmental regulation in a particular area, and the
power of courts to hear private civil causes of action respecting the
same subject area. Our legal system recognizes that governmental
regulation (whether legislative or administrative) is considered a far
more substantial intrusion into one's private affairs than is a private,
civil lawsuit over the same matter. For that reason, numerous cases
establish the requirement of a considerably greater nexus between a
135. Id. Of course, a plaintiff in a contract action might well find himself the object of a
counterclaim sounding in tort, so that the court's distinction here is somewhat tenuous.
136. Gudac v. Marianito, 1 Nav. Rep. 385 (1978) (termination of non-Indian plaintiff from
employment by tribe held illegal); Smoak Chevrolet Co. v. Barton, I Nav. Rep. 153 (1977)
(though acceleration clause must be disclosed under federal Truth-in-Lending Act, counterclaim arising therefrom against non-Indian car dealer was barred by statute of limitations);
Merrion & Bayless v. Begay, I Nay. Rep. 150 (1977) (oil company granted temporary restraining order against Navajo defendants' interference with their access to leased lands for exploration purposes); Dennison v. Tucson Gas & Elec. Co., I Nay. Rep. 95 (1974) (trial court dismissal of action against defendant non-Indian utility for lack of jurisdiction affirmed); Bedonie v.
Donaldson, 1 Nay. Rep. 40 (1973) (no Navajo court jurisdiction over non-Indian defendant for
tort action, under prior jurisdictional statute).
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governmental entity and those persons purportedly subject to its
regulatory power, than that between a court and persons subject to
its civil jurisdiction; for example, governments normally may not
37
govern persons or things beyond their geographical boundaries.
Courts, on the other hand, may constitutionally acquire personal
jurisdiction over persons anywhere in the world under modern
"long-arm" statutes, simply by proper service of summons, provided there are certain
"minimum contacts" between the forum and
38
the individual.'
The court in UNC Resources, however, while conceding broad
powers in Indian tribes to regulate non-Indian conduct in Indian
country, (a concession plainly compelled by the decision in Montana
v. United States) nonetheless steadfastly denied that non-Indians
could be made to respond to civil summonses issued by tribal
courts. 39 Simply in terms of the nature of the power being exercised,
the distinction is difficult to fathom.
This point further reveals the fallacy in the court's insistent reliance upon Oliphant as authority for the proposition that Navajo
courts may not hear civil suits against non-Indians. Criminal prosecution, the issue in Oliphant, is at base an exercise of governmental
regulatory authority-the police power in its most elemental
form.' 4 ° There, government is directly arrayed against private persons, seeking to enforce its laws. In contrast, in the context of private, civil litigation, government as such plays a negligible role, its
principal interest being the essentially neutral one of maintaining the
137. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Curry v. McCanless,
307 U.S. 357 (1939).
138. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). It should be noted, however, that
this doctrine applies only in the area of civil causes of action, not criminal matters (including
the enforcement of public penal statutes). See note 28 supra, and accompanying text. Enforcement of criminal laws has always been available only in the courts of the state whose laws have
been violated, and then only when the defendant is personally present. In this respect, the jurisdiction of courts over criminal defendants is comparable to the jurisdiction of a government to
regulate conduct.
139. 514 F. Supp. 361, 363 (D.N.M. 1981). There, the court stated that:
the issue here is not whether the Navajo tribe can regulate UNC's off-reservation
activities in order to protect Indian land. Some kind of regulation of some kinds
of activities may be within the tribe's power. But any such power does not include requiring UNC to answer as a civil defendant in Tribal Court for its offreservation activities; that issue was settled by Oliphant.
140. See note 138 supra. That Congress recognized the important distinction between tribal
criminal jurisdiction and civil jurisdiction is reflected in its enactment of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976), which contains an explicit federal remedy for criminal defendants, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, but no such remedy for civil litigants. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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integrity of the forum.' 4 To say, as the Supreme Court held in Oliphant, that Indian tribes have surrendered their power to arrest and
prosecute non-Indians, is to impose limits on tribal governmental
authority. That says nothing, however, about the competence of Indian courts in strictly civil matters, a point to which Oliphantdid not
speak. Williams, Kennerly, and Santa Clara, furthermore, establish
decisively that tribal courts are entirely competent to decide cases involving "important personal and property interests of . . . nonIndians. ""42

4. Summary
It is certain that Chischilly and UNC Resources will not be the last
judicial word on the issue of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, in
New Mexico or elsewhere, although these opinions themselves will
not be tested on appeal.'" 3 As energy development and other economic activity on Indian land accelerates, conflicts such as these will
undoubtedly proliferate. Some lines may be drawn against the exerbut it is respectfully subcise of tribal power over non-Indians,'
141. There are, admittedly, cases in which a question may-arise as to the propriety of a legislative act that enlarges the reach of a court's personal jurisdiction in the civil area, such as the
Navajo Tribal Council resolution that purported to authorize the tort suits against UNC. See
note 61 supra, and accompanying text. As shown in the text accompanying notes 130-36
supra, that enactment does not seem subject to challenge on the ground that it permits civil
suits against non-Indians. Beyond that, the only remaining question is whether, on its face, the
provision offends notions of due process by permitting the Navajo courts to assume personal
jurisdiction over persons not having the requisite "minimum contacts" with the forum. See
note 138 supra, and accompanying text. The concept of personal jurisdiction premised on
one's having "caused an action to occur" within the jurisdiction of the forum was apparently
approved by the Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (although in
that case, The Court held that the particular act in question was constitutionally insufficient to
provide a valid basis for personal jurisdiction). Here, the Navajo suits alleged that UNC's
negligence had caused the tailings dam to break, resulting in the release of toxic wastes that
flowed through, and thereby damaged, Navajo land. Such an allegation ought to be sufficient,
particularly since the likelihood that a break in the tailings dam would affect Navajo land was
clearly foreseeable. The dam was situated in an arroyo tributary to the Rio Puerco. Reference
to any detailed land status map would show precisely where fluids released from the dam
would flow, and that route traversed substantial Navajo land holdings.
142. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 45, 65 (1978).
143. The Navajo defendants in UNC Resources decided not to appeal the court's decision,
which they could have done under 28 U.S.C. 1292 (1976); rather, on June 22, 1981, they filed
an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim based on diversity jurisdiction, seeking
damages for losses they incurred due to the tailings spill. Concurrently, 177 other Navajos
moved to intervene in the case as defendants and counterclaimants, all alleging similar claims.
A state court suit was also filed against UNC and several other defendants, and that is also
pending. Whether Chischilly's attorneys would seek review of the New Mexico Supreme Court
decision in the United States Supreme Court was undecided as of the deadline fol'this article.
144. It might be said, however, that were Congress to remedy the effect of the Santa Clara
decision, see note 67 supra, and ensure a federal remedy for all violations of the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976), incorporating appropriate provisions to require exhaus-
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mitted that the lines laid down in Chischilly and UNC Resources are
unsupported by the precedents.
Finally, it must be admitted that the New Mexico Court of Appeals' analysis of the conflict of laws question in Chischilly v.
GMAC,"" upholding the applicability of Navajo law to repossessions on Navajo land, although reversed by the Supreme Court on
wholly different grounds, can no longer be regarded as of reliable
precedential value. It is to be hoped that the solid reasoning of the
court of appeals on this point will soon be reaffirmed.
II. MESCALERO APACHE TRIBE v. NEW MEXICO
The issue of tribal power over non-Indians, and the preemptive effect of comprehensive tribal regulation on state laws on the same
subject, was addressed in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. State of New
Mexico, '6 an extremely thoughtful opinion by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals last year, that upheld the tribal regulatory scheme
in all respects. The Mescalero Tribe had developed a comprehensive
scheme of fish and wildlife management on its mountain reservation. This scheme had led to dramatic improvements in range, habitat, and wildlife abundance. The tribe adopted hunting and fishing
regulations that complemented its management program, and revenues derived from non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation
had become a major source of tribal income. Even state officials
agreed that the tribe's management of reservation wildlife resources
was "exemplary. ' 1 4 7 Nevertheless, the state insisted that nonIndians on the reservation had to comply with New Mexico game
laws as well as those of the tribe, even though many of New Mexico's laws (as for example, those establishing seasons) conflicted
with the tribal laws and management scheme. The tribe sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, and won in the district court. The
court of appeals affirmed. It held that the state laws were preempted
by the tribe's complete exercise of its inherent power to control
wildlife on its reservation and by various federal actions in aid of the
tribe's sovereign powers, and that application of state law on the
tion of tribal remedies and respect for tribal norms, restrict relief against tribes to injunctive
and declaratory remedies, and provide the resources for tribes to improve their tribal courts
and regulatory procedures, non-Indian skepticism toward Indian governmental institutions
might well be allayed, at least to a substantial extent.
145. 19 N.M. St. B. Bull. 770 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 96 N.M. 113, 628
P.2d 683 (1981). See notes 23-29 supra, and accompanying text.
146. 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981). See
Estes, Indian Law, 1I N.M.L. Rev. 189, 193-95 (1981).
147. 630 F.2d at 726.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

reservation would infringe on the tribe's ability to make its own laws
and be governed by them.I 8
The state sought review in the United States Supreme Court, and
on April 6, 1981, the Court granted the state's petition for writ of
certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Tenth
Circuit "for further consideration in light of Montana v. United
States. 419 It is difficult to know what to make of the remand. Montana dealt with the very specific question of tribal power to regulate
non-Indian hunting and fishing only on non-Indian-owned fee land
within the Crow reservation.' 0 Under the circumstances of that
case,"' the Court held that the tribe had no such power. That holding was qualified by the Court's statement that a tribe "may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
5 2 The
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."'
148. Id. at 728-34. An important aspect of the opinion was the court's discussion of Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), in which the
Supreme Court had held that a tribal cigarette tax did not preempt a similar state tax as applied
to sales of cigarettes to non-Indians at a reservation "smokeshop." The smokeshops, the
Court noted, sold goods that had "no substantial connection to reservation lands," and their
existence was due solely to the price advantage they enjoyed by their asserted ability to avoid
state taxes by being located on the reservation. Id. at 155-56. In contrast, the Tenth Circuit observed in Mescalero that the tribal regulatory activity was not merely income-generating, but
also served other purposes integral to the tribe's management scheme, and the value realized
thereby was generated entirely on the reservation by tribal effort, in which the state played no
part. The facts thus fit entirely within the qualifications that, under Colville, warrant a finding
that state law is preempted. Cf. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (tribal laws
governing adoption of tribal members preempt any state jurisdiction in that area).
149. 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981); see notes 72-74supra, and accompanying text.
150. The Supreme Court could "readily agree" with the Ninth Circuit's ruling below that
the Crow Tribe had the power to regulate, or to prohibit altogether, non-Indian hunting and
fishing on Indian lands within the reservation. 101 S. Ct. at 1254. The Ninth Circuit had also
held that to the extent the tribe permitted non-Indian hunting and fishing on the reservation,
such activity was also fully subject to state fish and game laws. United States v. State of Montana, 604 F.2d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 1245 (1981). But the United States
did not seek review of that issue, and it was never presented to the Supreme Court.
Montana also decided a question of title to the beds of navigable rivers within Indian reservations, an important point, but one of no relevance to Mescalero.
151. Unlike the situation in Mescalero, the opinions in Montana reflect no effort by the
tribe to engage in any kind of comprehensive wildlife management program that would be impaired by a conflicting state scheme. Indeed, the tribal regulation at issue there was a flat proscription of any hunting or fishing within the reservation by anyone not a member of the tribe.
604 F.2d at 1164, 1165 n.4. The Supreme Court noted that the state had traditionally exercised
almost complete control over hunting and fishing on fee lands on the reservation, a situation to
which "the parties . . . had accommodated themselves." 101 S. Ct. at 1258 n. 13, 1259.
152. 101 S. Ct. at 1258.
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Court said that such effect could be discerned from the record before
it.'"

Given the very different facts in Mescalero, it is submitted that the
Montana opinion requires no change in the Tenth Circuit's previous
view of the extent of the Mescalero Tribe's power over non-Indian
hunting and fishing. In Mescalero, the state raised no issue regarding
regulation on fee lands. In fact there is a negligible amount of nonIndian-owned fee land within the Mescalero Reservation. The jurisdictional ruling in Montana, on the other hand, was strictly limited
to activities on non-Indian owned fee land. Even so, the comprehensive Mescalero tribal management program and the need to coordinate that program with regulation of hunting and fishing, the absence of any state contribution to that management effort, and the
importance of the wildlife resource to the tribe, economically and
otherwise, all dictate a very different result than that reached by the
court in Montana. It seems reasonable, in fact, to suggest that had
Mescalero reached the Supreme Court before Montana, the "exemplary" record and very responsible approach of the Mescalero
Tribe towards wildlife management might well have elicited a far
different response from the court than that reflected in the Montana
opinion-one more supportive of tribal regulatory power throughout Indian country. The Tenth Circuit may provide this support by
adhering to its excellent analysis of the issues in Mescalero, and reaffirming its earlier opinion.
III. THE GROSS RECEIPTS TAX CASES
Two cases decided during the Survey year, Ramah Navajo School
Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue "" and Tiffany Construction Co.
v. Bureau of Revenue,'" considered gross receipts taxes on Indian
lands. The New Mexico appellate courts dealt with the question of
the applicability of state gross receipts taxes to construction activities on Indian land conducted by non-Indian contractors under contract with Indian tribes or organizations. The courts held in both
cases that the tax was valid, despite recent decisions of the United
States Supreme Court that suggest a contrary result.
153.
The district court's unchallenged findings, on which the Court relied rather heavily,
showed that the tribe had lived with state regulation until recently, and that state regulation on
fee lands would not impair tribal regulation on trust lands. Id. at 1259.
154. 95 N.M. 708, 625 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412
(1981), cert. grantedby the United States Supreme Court Nov. 30, 1981.
155. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 673, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981).
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The area of Indian law with which these cases are concerned (state
power over non-Indians in Indian country) has never been definitively explained. This section will attempt to synthesize the Supreme
Court precedents involved. To this end, a thorough review of these
precedents is presented. The Tenth Circuit case of MescaleroApache
Tribe v. O'Cheskey, '56on which the two New Mexico cases relied,
will then be examined. Finally, the New Mexico cases themselves will
be reevaluated, with special attention given to Justice Sosa's creative
and compelling dissent in Tiffany Construction Co. v. Bureau of
Revenue.'17
A. State Taxes on Non-Indians in Indian Country: From Worcester
to CentralMachinery
When Chief Justice John Marshall, in Worcester v. Georgia,'58
formulated the dramatic doctrine that state law "can have no force"
within the bounds of Indian country,' 9 he made no distinctions between the regulation of Indian and non-Indian activities. Worcester
arose, in fact, over an effort by the State of Georgia to regulate the
entry of non-Indians into Cherokee land. The Court held this attempt to be wholly beyond the State's authority. Justice Black noted
in Williams v. Lee, however, that "[o]ver the years this court has
modified [Worcester's] principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be
jeopardized.'" 6 0 State power over non-Indians in Indian country is
the area in which the Worcester rule has been most drastically altered.
The earliest such "modification" of Worcester came in Thomas v.
Gay. 161 This case involved the power of a territory to tax cows which
were owned by non-Indians but were grazed on Indian land under a
federally approved grazing lease. The Court conceded that the tax
might affect the value of the grazing lease to the Indian. It viewed
the possible burden on Indian interests, however, as "too remote
and indirect" to intrude upon Congress' power over Indian affairs.' 62 Thomas v. Gay thus gave rise to what has become a signifi156. 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1417 (1981).
157. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 673, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981).
158. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see note 36supra.
159. Id. at 561.
160. 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
161. 169U.S. 264(1898).
162. Id. at 275. Thomas relied in part upon Utah & N. Ry. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885), and
Maricopa & Phoenix R.R. v. Arizona Territory, 156 U.S. 347 (1895), both of which sustained
the validity of territorial taxes on railroads passing through Indian reservations. (Although the
Court in Fisherrepeatedly referred to the "Fort Hill" Reservation, 116 U.S. at 29, 30, it appears certain that the intended reference is to the Fort Hall (Shoshone-Bannock) Reservation,
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cant and now controversial exception to the Worcester doctrine, that
state law may apply to non-Indians within Indian country, so long as
it imposes no substantial or direct burdens on Indian interests.1 63
In Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Commission, ' the state
contended that it could apply its "transaction privilege" tax'6 to the
gross proceeds of non-Indian businesses located on the Navajo Indian reservation. That contention was rejected, however, in the first
Supreme Court decision that made any inroads on the notion that
states could freely tax non-Indians within Indian country. The nature of the tax was of central importance to the Court in Warren
TradingPost. A tax on a sale to an Indian, which would routinely be
passed on by the seller to the Indian customer, was not nearly so "remote" or "indirect" a burden on the Indian as were mere property
taxes on non-Indian cows. The Thomas v. Gay exception, therefore,
could not apply. The Court pointed out at length that Congress had
from the earliest days of the republic exercised its power to regulate
the activities of non-Indians who engage in business with reservation
Indians. That regulation extended even to determining "the kind
and quantity of goods and the prices at which such goods shall be
in southern Idaho.) In both of those cases, however, the Court's reasoning in upholding the
challenged tax was ultimately bottomed on its view that the railroad right-of-way was no longer
a part of Indian country. As the Court stated in Fisher, the cession of the necessary land by the
tribe, and Congress' confirmation of the grant to the railroad, withdrew the land from the reservation, such that the road and the facilities therein "became subject to the laws of the Territory relating to railroads, as if the reservation had never existed." 116 U.S. at 32 (emphasis
added). See also Maricopa & Phoenix R.R. v. Arizona Territory, 156 U.S. 347, 351 (1895). It
would seem, thus, that these cases provide no useful authority for state taxation of non-Indian
property on land that remains Indian country, although they are sometimes cited in that context. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). The reasoning of Thomas v. Gay was
reaffirmed in a very similar case, Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U.S. 588 (1898).
163. Thomas was followed in Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118
(1906), in which the county had assessed a property tax on cattle that were maintained by a
Jesuit mission on the Flathead Reservation largely for purposes related to the mission's charitable enterprises. The Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a challenge to the tax for
lack of jurisdiction and observed that "the Indians' interest in this kind of property, situated
on their reservations, [is] not sufficient to exempt such property, when owned by private individuals, from taxation." Id. at 128-29. The Court also rejected the suggestion that the mission
was entitled to exemption as, in effect, an instrumentality of federal policy. The "federal instrumentality" argument eventually led to a series of decisions holding that non-Indian lessees
of Indian mineral interests were, in effect, instrumentalities of federal policy promoting
development of Indian resources, and that under the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity, the lessees' proceeds were immune from state taxation. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Barnsdall
Refineries, 296 U.S. 521 (1936); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U.S. 549 (1919); Howard v.
Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U.S. 503 (1918). That line of cases was overruled in Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
164. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
165. The Arizona transaction privilege tax is the equivalent of New Mexico's gross receipts
tax. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§42-1309, 42-1312 (1956); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§7-9-2, 7-9-4
(1978). Such a tax is commonly called a "sales tax."

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12

sold to the Indians."' 6 The Court held that Congress had dealt so
comprehensively with the subject of business practices in Indian
remains for state laws imposing additional
country "that no room
1 67
burdens on traders."

This passage from Warren TradingPost is often cited as the origin
of the so-called "federal preemption" test for determining the extent
of state power over non-Indians in Indian country. ," Equally important, however, is the opinion's focus on the directness and substantiality of the burden that application of the state tax to the trader
would impose on Indians, the basis of the reasoning in Thomas v.
Gay. In Warren Trading Post, the Court's "preemption" language,
in the opinion's discussion of Congress' regulation of reservation
businesses, provides a means of spotlighting the importance of the
Indian interests being imposed upon by the state tax. To view the
case narrowly as a "federal preemption" case is to miss its place in
the mainstream of cases dealing with state jurisdiction in Indian
country. "9
It was more than ten years after Warren Trading Post before the
Court next addressed state power over non-Indians in Indian country. When the issue next arose, it came in the context of sales taxes as
applied to sales by Indian Sellers to non-Indian purchasers. Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, ' 70 and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, ' which was decided
four years later,, both dealt with on-reservation "smokeshops"
which had become popular revenue-raising devices for Indians because of their putative exemption from heavy state cigarette taxes. 7 2
The Court upheld the full range of state tax and recordkeeping requirements as applied to sales to non-Indians in both cases. With
those decisions, the Court effectively wiped out the price advantage
the smokeshops had enjoyed over off-reservation cigarette vendors.
The Court's analysis began with the assumption that state sales
taxes could validly be applied to sales to non-Indians, unless the im166. Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 689 (1965). The Court also noted
the extensive regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior at 25 C.F.R. §§251, 252,
governing on-reservation businesses. 380 U.S. at 689-90.
167. 380 U.S. at 690.
168. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Tiffany
Const. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 623, 625, 629 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1981).
169. In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 170 n.6 (1973), the Court
stated that "the reasoning of Warren TradingPost cannot be so restricted [to a "preemption"
analysis]," and that the result there also derived from the longstanding congressional policy of
leaving reservation Indians free from state control.
170. 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
171. 447U.S. 134 (1980).
172. Id. at 144-45.
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position of the taxes could be shown to burden the Indian seller. In
Moe, the Court placed considerable weight on the fact that the Montana tax law at issue laid the obligation to pay the tax directly on the
ultimate consumer. The Court viewed the only burden on the Indian
seller to be that of collecting the tax for the state, a burden the Court
felt was "minimal."' 73 The decision did not even mention the fact
that enforcement of the tax eliminated the seller's price advantage
with respect to cigarette sales to non-Indians.
The four tribes involved in Colville had passed their own cigarette
sales tax ordinances, which had been approved by the Secretary of
the Interior. They argued that those enactments preempted the state
taxes. They had also made an extensive record on the economic importance of the smokeshops, as principal contributors to tribal revenue. The Court thus was forced to address squarely the contention
that application of the state tax would directly and substantially impair tribal economic interests. The Colville opinion's treatment of
that argument added another element to the analysis of when state
law may apply to non-Indians in Indian country. While the Court acknowledged that the tribes had a legitimate interest in raising revenue, it viewed that interest as "strongest when the revenues are derived from value generated on the reservation by activities involving
the tribes and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services.'" 74 The Court noted that the smokeshops owed their existence
solely to their ability to market the supposed exemption from state
taxes, not to any value "generated on the reservation by activities in
which the tribes have a significant interest.'" 7 I The Court was not inclined to permit the Indian country immunity from state law to be
exploited for such bald economic purposes. Colville indicates that
only burdens on those Indian interests that the court views as "significant" will justify exemptions from state taxation of non-Indians
in Indian country. What kinds of interests are sufficiently "significant" is a question which must await further development through
case law.
Two decisions that followed Colville by just a few months, however, demonstrated that a reasonably forceful showing of congressional concern with the subject matter of the asserted state regulation will, just as in Warren Trading Post, preclude the application of
state law. The cases, White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,7 6
173.
174.
175.
176.

425 U.S. at 483.
447 U.S. at 156-57.
Id. at 155.
448 U.S. 136(1980).
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and Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission,'7 7 both
arose in Arizona. White Mountain was a challenge to the imposition
of state motor carrier license taxes and use fuel taxes on a nonIndian logging company doing business entirely on the White Mountain Apache Reservation, under contract with the tribal timber enterprise. The Court recounted at great length the nature and scope of
federal regulation and management of the timber harvesting process, '1 and concluded that "the present case . . . is in all relevant
The perrespects indistinguishable from Warren Trading Post.
'9

vasive federal involvement in the activity, the absence of any state
responsibility, and the federal policy of leaving the tribe "largely
free to run the reservation and its affairs without state control,"' 8
precluded any state taxation.
CentralMachinery, like Warren Trading Post, involved the applicability of the Arizona sales tax to a sale of goods to Indians. There,
however, the similarities between the two cases end. Unlike the reservation trader in Warren Trading Post, Central Machinery was an
off-reservation firm, with neither a permanent place of business on
the reservation nor a federal Indian Trader's license. Moreover, the
buyer, Gila River Farms, was not an individual Indian, but a tribal
farming enterprise which had purchased eleven farm tractors from
the company. The Arizona Supreme Court viewed these facts as sufficient to distinguish the case from Warren Trading Post, and it
upheld the tax. 'I
The United States Supreme Court, however, again saw the Warren
Trading Post decision as controlling, and regarded the factual differences as inconsequential. The Indian trader statutes' 2 "plainly"
governed the transaction, the Court said, and the company's failure
to have a license was irrelevant since it is "the existence of the Indian
trader statutes . . . and not their administration, that preempts the

field of transactions with Indians occurring on reservations."' 8 3 The
Court reasoned that to exempt the transaction because the sellers
had no place of business on the reservation would conflict with con-

177. 448 U.S. 160(1980).
178. 448 U.S. 136, 145-48 (1980).
179. Id. at 152-53.
180. Id. at 152 (quoting from Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685,
690 (1965)).
181. State v. Central Mach. Co., 121 Ariz. 183, 589 P.2d 426 (1979), rev'd, 448 U.S. 160
(1980). The reversal by the United States Supreme Court vindicated the decision of the
Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona, which had held for the company. The superior
court judge who rendered that decision, Sandra Day O'Connor, has since been named to the
Supreme Court by President Reagan. Her predecessor on the Court, Justice Stewart, dissented
in both White Mountain Apache and Central Machinery.
182. 25 U.S.C. §§261-264.
183. 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980).
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gressional intent, and would open the door to easy circumvention of
the statutory scheme. 8 4
One can discern in this line of Supreme Court decisions, from
Thomas v. Gay to Central Machinery, a reasonably clear method of
analysis for determining the circumstances under which state taxes
(and possibly other forms of state regulatory power) will be held to
apply to non-Indians in Indian country. The first question in this
analysis is whether the tax will directly burden any Indian interest. If
not, then as in Thomas, the state law should apply. If there is such a
burden, however, one must take a second step, to examine the tribal,
federal and state interests involved, in the manner required by Warren Trading Post and Colville.
As for the second step of the analysis, Warren Trading Post establishes that where Congress, in the exercise of its special power in Indian affairs, has demonstrated clear federal concern for the burdened Indian interest, that alone will oust any state regulatory power
at all. This doctrine has been referred to as the "federal preemption" test. Where the federal interest in the subject matter is less
clear or is absent, however, one must examine the tribal interest
itself, and determine whether it is sufficiently "significant," within
the meaning of Colville, to warrant an immunity from state law.
Central Machinery and White Mountain Apache both spoke in
'"preemption" terms because of the evident federal concern in the
areas of harvesting of Indian timber and business practices in Indian
country. "Preemption," however, in this context amounts to a
weighing of interests, in which strong federal concern outweighs virtually any state interest in the same activity. Had there been no clear
federal concern in those two cases, however, the court should have
looked to the tribal interests in the affected activity. Were, for example, the interests of the White Mountain Tribe in the economic viability of its timber enterprise deemed "significant" in Colville's
terms, the outcome of the case should be the same even without extensive federal regulation of the activity. 8, I
184. Id.; accord, United States ex rel. Hornell v. One 1976 Chevrolet Station Wagon, 585
F.2d 978 (10th Cir. 1978). In a footnote, the Court specifically rejected the relevance of the
"legal incidence" of the tax to the Court's holding. Although the Arizona transaction privilege
tax legally falls only on the seller, the Court refused to close its eyes to the fact that the purchaser would ultimately pay it. 448 U.S. at 164, n.3.
185. In White Mountain Apache, 448 U.S. at 145, the Court stated that cases of this sort
will always require a "particularized inquiry into the nature of the State, Federal and tribal interests at stake," suggesting that the existence of a "significant" tribal interest may not, alone,
be enough to justify precluding the application of state law. That phrase indicates an approach
that would balance clearly competing interests, the very approach suggested by Justice Sosa,
dissenting in Tiffany Const. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 673, 756, 629 P.2d
1225 (1981). See text accompanying note 213 infra.
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It is submitted that the consistent application of this approach to
cases of this type ought to bring some order and predictability to this
area of the law along lines generally consistent with the spirit of the
Worcester doctrine. 186
B. The Inn of the Mountain Gods Case: Mescalero Apache Tibe v.
0 'Cheskey
Before analyzing the two Survey cases in the light of the above approach, it would be useful to discuss in some detail an important decision on which the Survey opinions largely relied. A few weeks
before Central Machinery and White Mountain Apache were decided, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey (MAT). 187 The case involved a
challenge to the imposition of New Mexico gross receipts taxes on
the work done by contractors who built the Inn of the Mountain
Gods resort complex and a tribal housing project, recreation area
and campground, on the Mescalero Apache Reservation in southern
New Mexico. The district court had upheld the applicability of the
taxes in most respects and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The contractors in MAT were New Mexico and out-of-state businesses '88 that had no places of business on the reservation. Their
employees performed the work on the reservation, but resided elsewhere. Most of the contractors were issued Indian traders' licenses
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the work, and all of their contracts were with the tribe or a tribal entity. Additionally, the contractor on the housing project was explicitly made an agent of the tribe
186. It might be noted that the Tenth Circuit decision in the Mescalero hunting and fishing
case, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated and
remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981), see text accompanying notes 147-154supra, is entirely consistent with this approach. There, the state game and fish laws conflicted with the comprehensive tribal wildlife management scheme, and application of the state laws to non-Indians on the
Mescalero Reservation would clearly and directly impair that scheme. The first step in the analysis was thus satisfied.
The court's opinion contained a lengthy discussion labeled "Federal Preemption," 630 F.2d
at 728-32. The court found no pervasive federal regulation in the specific field, however, and it
therefore looked to the tribal interest in wildlife management. The court felt that interest was
enormous, bearing a critical relationship to the tribe's traditional interdependence with the
land. In light of that "significant" tribal interest (and the relatively insignificant state interest),
state game laws were held not to apply on the reservation.
187. 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1417 (1981).
188. The tax assessed against the out-of-state contractors was the state's "compensating
tax," as provided by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-9-7 (1978). The compensating tax is that tax applied
to transactions as to which the gross receipts tax is inapplicable (for example, because they occurred out of state) but as to which it would have been applicable had the transactions occurred
in New Mexico. Both the district court and the court of appeals treated the taxes as indistinguishable for purposes of the case. The term "gross receipts tax" as used in this discussion will
refer to both taxes, as applicable.
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for purposes of that project, and materials purchased for the housing project were paid for by the tribe.' 89 The state assessed gross receipts taxes against the contractors for their work on the projects.
The tribe sued the state, claiming that those taxes were inapplicable
to the contractors' bills for services under the doctrine of Warren
Trading-Post. The tribe claimed additionally that the purchases of
materials for the housing project were exempt from gross receipts
taxes because they were made directly by the tribe.' 0
The federal district court agreed that because the housing contractor was acting as an agent for the tribe, he was exempt from gross
receipts taxes on sales of materials purchased for the housing project. On all other issues, however, the court ruled in favor of the
state. The court held that the issuance of traders' licenses to the contractors had been beyond the authority of the BIA, and was therefore void. The district court regarded the contractors on these projects as not within the reach of the Indian trader statutes, largely
because they had no permanent place of business or residences on
the reservation, and because their services were sold pursuant to
complex and sophisticated contracts which were negotiated by attorneys and tribal and BIA officials. As the court stated, "it was
hardly a situation such as the federal laws and regulations were
designed to cover, i.e., one where the Indian could be at the mercy of
the white man in the absence of federal protection. '"' 9 ' Having disposed of the licenses, the court saw no grounds on which the tribe
could avoid the tax. The court characterized the economic impact of
the tax on the tribe as "an indirect burden" citing Thomas v. Gay. 9 2
The district court concluded its opinion with a lament on the need
for definitive legislation by Congress to settle these troublesome jurisdictional issues. 193
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court on
all points.' 94 The court emphasized that the "legal incidence" of the
189. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskey, 439 F. Supp. 1063, 1066, 1068-70 (D.N.M.
1977), aff'd, 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1417 (1981).
190. New Mexico allows a deduction from gross receipts for sales of tangible personal property to an Indian tribe. N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-9-54 (1978).
191. 439 F. Supp. at 1068 (footnote omitted). After Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980), this portion of the district court opinion cannot be regarded as
sound. There, the Supreme Court specifically held that the failure of the seller to have a permanent place of business on the reservation, and the fact that the buyer was a tribal entity, did not
avoid the applicability of the trader statutes. See text accompanying notes 182-184 supra.
192. 439 F.Supp. at 1072.
193. Id. at 1074-75.
194. 625 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1417 (1981). The state had crossappealed from the district court's ruling that the housing project contractor was an agent of the
tribe in purchasing materials for the project. Chief Judge Seth's opinion for the majority did
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New Mexico gross receipts tax is on the seller, not the ultimate consumer."' The opinion distinguished Warren Trading Post on the
ground that the trader there was licensed, and permanently located
on the reservation, and such trading had been "long regulated by
Congress."'
CentralMachinery and White Mountain Apache were decided by
the Supreme Court just three weeks after the Tenth Circuit's opinion
was issued in MAT. The tribe petitioned for rehearing, arguing that
those decisions cast doubt on the Tenth Circuit opinion. The court
denied the petition in a short but revealing opinion issued on August
25, 1980.'97 It distinguished Central Machinery on the sole ground
that that case involved a sale of "goods," not services. The court
added that, as it had determined that the case before it was not controlled by the Indian trader statutes, Central Machinery was not applicable. The court found nothing in White Mountain Apache to
change its mind.
The "goods"/"services" distinction was the only perceivable difference between Mescalero and CentralMachinery. Despite the tenuous logic of that distinction, 9s and the extensive consideration given
the MAT case on appeal, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving further elucidation of the reach of Central Machinery for another day.
Neither the district court opinion in MAT, nor that of the court of
appeals, can be reconciled with the line of Supreme Court authority
discussed above. The taxes at issue in MAT unquestionably posed a
not address that issue (although Judge Logan, concurring, expressed agreement with the district court's ruling, id. at 972), but the order of affirmance necessarily decided the issue against
the state.
195. As noted, supra note 184, in Central Machinery the Supreme Court declared the "legal
incidence" of the tax to be irrelevant in the context of sales to reservation Indians.
196. 625 F.2d at 971. Judges Doyle and McKay wrote strong dissents, both rejecting the
relevance of the "legal incidence" test, and viewing the imposition of the state taxes on work
performed for the tribe as contravening the policy of leaving reservation Indians free from
state control. 624 F.2d at 975.
197. 625 F.2d at 990.
198. It is true that the Indian trader statutes frequently refer to introduction of "goods"
into Indian country, see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§261, 263, 264 (1976). The statutes also refer to
"trading" with the Indians, however, id. §§261-264, a term that could embrace the full scope
of business dealings with ultimate consumers. Given the stated motivations behind those enactments, see Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 688-90 (1965); Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160, 163-65 (1980), there would seem to be
little ground for distinguishing between sellers of goods and sellers of services to Indians in interpreting the statutes, if both could reasonably fall within the statutory terms. The Tenth Circuit made no effort to explain such a distinction in its opinion on rehearing in Mescalero. 625
F.2d at 990.

Winter 19821

INDIAN LAW

direct burden on the tribe. 9' 9 The federal interest in regulation of
persons who do business with Indians in Indian country, moreover,
especially after Central Machinery, should have precluded any state
taxes on the transactions in MAT. Both the district court and the
court of appeals held that those transactions were outside the scope
of the federal Indian trader statutes, though as suggested above,
neither line of reasoning seems persuasive. 200 Neither court analyzed
the affected tribal interest to determine whether it, wholly apart
from the federal concern for commerce with Indians, might have
warranted striking down the state taxes under the reasoning of Colville. The opinions are, thus, both inconsistent with the precedents,
and incomplete in their analyses.
C. The Survey Cases: Ramah Navajo and Tiffany
It is against this backdrop that the decision of the New Mexico
Court of Appeals in Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of
Revenue,2 0 ' and that of the New Mexico Supreme Court in Tiffany
Const. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue0 2 must be examined. It is submitted that in light of the principles that have governed cases such as
these, from Thomas v. Gay to Central Machinery, neither of the
New Mexico appellate court opinions can be commended, but that
the dissent in Tiffany reflects a thoughtful and creative approach to
this difficult area of the law.
Ramah Navajo involved a situation very much like that in MAT.
A gross receipts tax was assessed against work performed by a New
Mexico contractor who was under contract to the local Indian school
board. The contractor built a school complex and related facilities
on trust land within the Ramah Navajo Reservation southeast of
Gallup.203 The school board, which was incorporated under state law
199. But see note 217 infra, and accompanying text. As discussed previously, the power of
states to tax non-Indians or their property in Indian country has, from its origins, been seen as
an exception to the Worcester doctrine that state laws had no effect in Indian country. The justification for the exception was the remoteness of the possible burden such a tax might impose
on Indian interests. Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898). Such a tax should always require justification in terms of Worcester and Thomas. Where it intrudes upon some apparent federal or
tribal interest as was the case in MAT, it can hardly be termed "remote." The burden might be
relatively minor, but that does not make it "indirect." This analysis is entirely missing from
the opinions in MAT.
200. See notes 191, 196 and 198 supra, and accompanying text.
201. 95 N.M. 708, 625 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 17, 627 P.2d 412
(1981), cert. granted, by the United States Supreme Court Nov. 30, 1981.
202. 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 673, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981).
203. 95 N.M. 708, 625 P.2d 1225. The Ramah Reservation is a "satellite" reservation of the
Navajo Nation. See note 31 supra.
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as a non-profit corporation, built and operated the school under
contract with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and is considered a "tri20
bal organization" under federal law. 1
The New Mexico Court of Appeals regarded the tax at issue to be
entirely within the state's power to assess, because it fell on the nonIndian contractor, and imposed only an "indirect" burden on the
school board.20" The board, apparently taking a cue from the federal
district court decision in the MAT case, argued that the contractor
merely acted as an agent for the board in purchasing the material for
the school. The court noted, however, that the contracts governing
the project, unlike those in MAT, established no basis for any finding of an agency relationship."0 6
In Tiffany, the contractor was an Arizona firm, hired by the
Navajo Tribe to construct a road on the New Mexico portion of the
Navajo reservation. Tiffany's effort to avoid the New Mexico tax
began prior to 1976, and the state supreme court considered the matter only after the court of appeals' determination in favor of the
state (which the supreme court declined to review) was vacated and
remanded by the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of White Mountain Apache and Central Machinery.20 7 In its
opinion on remand, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed those
two decisions and Warren Trading Post, and simply declared that
they were all "distinguishable." The court offered no explanation
why, beyond a recitation of the facts and a summary of the holding
204. 25 U.S.C. 450b(c) (1976).
205. The court relied heavily on its earlier decision in G. M. Shupe, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 89 N.M. 265, 550 P.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1976). That case involved imposition of gross receipts tax on a federal contractor who constructed a dam on the Nambe Pueblo Reservation.
Although the contract was with the Bureau of Reclamation, and tribal involvement in the project was unclear, the court of appeals discussed the case as if it were an Indian law question, and
found no reason to exempt the contractor from paying the tax.
The Ramah Navajo court also relied upon its opinion in an earlier stage of the Tiffany Construction litigation, Tiffany Const. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 93 N.M. 593, 603 P.2d 332 (Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 629, 614 P.2d 546 (1979), vacated and remanded, 448 U.S.
902 (1980), which the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed on remand from the United States
Supreme Court, 20 N.M. St. B. Bull. 673, 629 P.2d 1225 (1981), in the opinion under consideration in the text.
206. 625 P.2d at 1228. The board also contended that the contractor was entitled to deduct
the value of the materials used in the project, because those constituted tangible personal property sold to an exempt entity under N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-9-54 (1978). The court rejected that argument, noting that portion of that statute which provided that where the performance of a
"service" involves the utilization of such property, the value of the property is not deductible,
and the contractor's activities clearly constituted a "service" under N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-9-3(K)
(1978). The court characterized the board's further argument, that the board was "engaged in
the construction business," and was therefore entitled to a deduction under the same two provisions, as "spurious." 625 P.2d at 1229.
207. 448 U.S. 902 (1980); see note 205 supra.
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of each. The court viewed Congress' occupation of the fields of trading with the Indians (in Warren Trading Post) and timber management (in White Mountain Apache) as crucial to those decisions, but
saw no similar expression of congressional interest relevant to Tiffany's work on reservation roads. The court quoted at length from
the Tenth Circuit's MAT opinion, especially the "legal incidence"
analysis, and concluded that the tax could lawfully be assessed
against the contractor. o8
Justice Sosa dissented, in an opinion that bears careful attention,
because of its sensitive effort to bring some order to the issue of state
taxing power over non-Indians in Indian country.2"' The dissent reviewed the principal precedents on jurisdiction in Indian country,
correctly noting that Central Machinery had expanded the Warren
Trading Post doctrine, by its explicit rejection of the "legal incidence" test for determining the legality of a state tax in Indian
country.2 10 The dissent further observed that the preemption analysis
in White Mountain relied in part on "the extensive federal regulations governing roads developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs,"
an area of regulation directly relevant to the Tiffany case. 2 ' That expression of federal interest, the dissent reasoned, was more than sufficient to justify holding the New Mexico tax inapplicable, particularly in light of the statement from White Mountain that " 'a claim
that [the State] may assess taxes on non-Indians engaged in commerce on the reservation whenever there is no express congressional
statement to the contrary . . . is simply not the law.' ,,212

Justice Sosa took the view that the federal concern for reservation
roads sufficiently precluded any state taxing power. He then went
further, saying that even if the federal/tribal interest was not sufficient to fully preempt state power, a balancing test should be applied to weigh the respective interests of the competing sovereigns.2 13 Justice Sosa applied this balancing test to the facts before
208. 629 P.2d at 1229.
209. Id. at 1230-33 (Sosa, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 1231; see 448 U.S. at 136 n.3. Of course, Central Machinery also plowed new
ground by applying federal preemption even where the business was not a licensed trader and
had no business site on the reservation, and the buyer was a tribal entity.
211. The road which Tiffany had been hired to improve was a BIA road. Id. at 1226.
212. Id. at 1231 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 150-51
(1980).
213. 629 P.2d at 1231. This concept, though not explicitly stated in prior cases, would seem
to be a reasonable rationalization of passages from Warren Trading Post, White Mountain
Apache and Central Machinery, which discuss (without explaining their significance) the relative state interests and duties in the particular situation. See, e.g., 380 U.S. at 690 (Indian
trader statutes relieve states of regulatory burdens on reservations); 448 U.S. at 150 ("respondents have been unable to identify any regulatory function or service performed by the State
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him, and concluded that the state's interest was relatively insignificant, and was far outweighed by the federal and tribal governmental
interests. He observed that the company was an Arizona corporation
not licensed in New Mexico, that its employees on this project lived
and worked on the reservation throughout their work, and that the
materials were purchased in Arizona or from the Navajo tribe, and
were shipped to the site on reservation roads. 1 4 The majority opinion, he noted, had been able to identify only two ways in which Tiffany "benefited" from New Mexico governmental services; it
enjoyed the state's clean air, and it used roads on the reservation
maintained by the state.2 5 The dissent pointed out that the same can
be said for many other citizens of nearby states, who do not thereby
become subject to New Mexico taxes. Finally, the dissent carefully
distinguished the MAT opinion, noting that in MAT the contractors
and their employees did in fact live and have their businesses off the
reservation (most of them in New Mexico) and daily enjoyed the full
gamut of state services. More important, the cost of the taxes imposed on construction of the Inn of the Mountain Gods could be
passed on by the Mescalero Tribe to those who patronized the resort.
In Tiffany, by contrast, the Navajo Tribe was engaged in a traditional governmental activity, road construction and maintenance,
whose costs could not be passed on to anyone. The state tax, thus,
bore directly on a governmental function of the tribe.2 '6
Justice Sosa's thoughtful analysis of the precedents and competing interests in Tiffany seems entirely correct, and fully in accord
with the spirit and the terms of Thomas v. Gay, Warren Trading
Post, CentralMachinery and White Mountain Apache, the controlling precedents. As suggested above, the approach dictated by those
cases, and essentially followed in Justice Sosa's dissent, requires first
a determination of whether the application of the state tax to the
non-Indian will directly and proximately burden any Indian interest.
If so, the court should next look at the interest affected. Where Congress has demonstrated that the interest is within an area of federal
that would justify the assessment of taxes for activities on Bureau and tribal roads within the
reservation"). In the absence of an overriding federal interest, a weighing of tribal and state interests in the affected activity would appear to be a reasonable and intelligent approach to the
assessment of the significance of the tribal interest required by Colville. As pointed out supra,
note 185, such an analysis is foreshadowed in CentralMachinery.
214. 629 P.2d at 1232.
215. Id. The majority also stated that Tiffany enjoyed "the overall general protection afforded contractors by the laws of the State of New Mexico." Id. at 1226. Since Tiffany was not
licensed to do business in the state, however, it is doubtful whether it could claim any such protection.
216. Id. at 1232-33.

Winter 1982]

INDIAN LAW

concern (such as harvesting of Indian timber), that showing, alone,
ousts any state taxing power affecting that area. Where the federal
interest is less certain, however, the court must decide, under the
qualification set forth in Colville, whether the Indian interest is sufficiently "significant." That analysis might also call for a weighing
of the competing state interest assertedly justifying application of
the tax.
This approach compels the conclusion that Ramah Navajo and
Tiffany were both wrongly decided. It is apparent that the gross receipts tax in each case burdens the Indian entity, directly and proximately, and in neither instance may the tax be passed on.2" 7 The interest being burdened in each case, reservation roads in Tiffany and
Indian education in Ramah Navajo, are also areas in which there is
demonstrable federal concern.2" 8 Even were that concern deemed insufficient by itself to oust the state taxes here at issue, however, it
seems apparent that the tribal governmental interest in these two
areas is substantial and "significant," and bears directly upon the
welfare of Indian people and the development of their human and
physical resources. The competing state interest, at least as analyzed
9
in Justice Sosa's dissent in Tiffany, is minimal by comparison." In

217. See text accompanying note 216 supra. Justice Sosa's point that in MAT, the tribe
could pass the tax burden on to patrons of the resort complex is, thus, quite pertinent, in that
under those circumstances it could be argued that the tax is not in fact a "burden" in the real
sense; or that, to the extent the passing on of the tax requires that the tribe charge higher prices
at the resort, and thus possibly lose some business, the burden is indirect, just as it was in
Thomas v. Gay. This reasoning ought to be viewed with caution, however, since it could result
in state taxation of virtually any tribal commercial activity, where the tax might be passed on.
Other aspects of the "burden," such as the amount of the tax, recordkeeping requirements,
and loss of price advantages ought to be examined as well. As indicated below, see note 218 infra, sales to Indians in Indian country ought never to be taxable by states after Central Machinery.
218. As noted in Justice Sosa's dissent in Tiffany, the federal interest in reservation road
construction and maintenance was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in White Mountain
Apache. 629 P.2d at 1231. Indian education has long been one of the preeminent concerns of
federal Indian policy, see, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§271-304b, and was most recently manifested in
the Indian Education Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§2001-2019. Federal regulations governing Indian education cover more than sixty pages of the Code of Federal Regulations. 25 C.F.R.
§§31.0 to 36.23 (1980).
219. See text accompanying notes 213-215 supra. The facts in Ramah Navajo, to be sure,
might well show a greater nexus between the contractor and the state, but that connection is
probably no greater than that presented in Central Machinery and there is no apparent reason
why ordinary provision of state services should be any more consequential to the result in
Ramah Navajo than it was there. Central Machinery, indeed, seems to stand for the proposition that any commercial transaction with an Indian consumer that occurs within Indian country, at least for "goods" (but, as suggested supra note 198, the reasoning ought to extend to
sales of "services" as well, notwithstanding MAT), is exempt from state gross receipts or
similar tax.
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short, under the relevant Supreme Court precedents, both Ramah
Navajo and Tiffany should have been decided against the state.
IV. CONCLUSION

It is concededly somewhat unusual for a Survey article to arrive at
the conclusion that all of the cases under review were wrongly decided. That that is the view taken herein says something about recent
directions in Indian law, and the troublesome "pressure point" represented by these cases. Most of the major jurisdictional cases
among the spurt of Indian law decisions of the past decade dealt with
questions of state power over Indians in Indian country, and in general, the cases went consistently against the existence of such
power.2 2 With the growth of tribal governmental power and competence and the increase in the development of natural resources and in
other economic activity in Indian country, however, an area of increasing concern has been that of governmental power over nonIndians in Indian country. In decisions such as Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation2 2 ' and Montana v.
United States2 2 the Supreme Court has upheld broad powers of the
tribes. Additionally, in cases such as CentralMachinery v. Arizona
Tax Commission" ' the Court appears to have limited state power
sharply. The decisions under consideration in the foregoing discussion, however, give clear warning that this may well prove to be an
area of considerable tension between the Supreme Court on the one
hand, and lower federal courts and state courts on the other. Competition for increasingly scarce governmental revenues, and the more
fundamental struggles for broader power, will no doubt lead to
more decisions like Chischilly, UNC Resources, Ramah Navajo and
Tiffany. Whether such decisions stand may well determine the viability of Indian tribes as coordinate governmental entities.
220. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1923) (no state income
tax on Indian income earned in Indian country); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (no state property tax on Indian property, no state vendor's license
fees on Indian seller, and no state cigarette sales tax on Indian purchasers in Indian country);
Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (no state property tax on Indian-owned mobile
homes in Indian country); Eastern Navajo Indus. v. Bureau of Revenue, 89 N.M. 369, 552
P.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1976) (no state tax on income of Indian corporation in Indian country);
Wauneka v. Campbell, 22 Ariz. App. 287, 526 P.2d 1085 (1974) (state financial responsibility
law does not apply to Indians involved in accident in Indian country); Benally v. Marcum, 89
N.M. 463, 553 P.2d 1270 (1976) (city police may not arrest Indian in Indian country); Joe v.
Marcum, 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980) (state court may not garnish Indian income earned in .
Indian country).
221. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
222. 101S. Ct. 1245 (1981).
223. 448 U.S. 160(1980).

